

U.S.G.

NEWSLETTER

Union of Socialist Geographers

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ABOUT THE U.S.G.

The Union of Socialist Geographers was organised in Toronto in May 1974. The consensus of those gathered in Toronto was that an organisation - the USG - be formed to improve communication among those geographers who agree with the principles in the organisation's aims:

The purpose of our union is to work for the radical restructuring of our societies in accord with the principles of social justice. As geographers and as people we will contribute to this process in two complementary ways:

1. organising and working for radical change in our communities, and
2. developing geographic theory to contribute to revolutionary struggle.

Thus we subscribe to the principle: from each according to ability, to each according to need. We declare that the development of a humane, non-alienating society requires, as its most fundamental step, socialization of the ownership of the means of production.

The USG currently has members in Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America as well as North America. Several active groups exist in both Canada and the United States, including academic and non-academic geographers, and non-geographers. An active section of the USG in Britain and Ireland plans to hold annual meetings at the time and place of the IBG annual meetings. The USG publishes a Newsletter several times a year and holds an annual meeting (in North America) in April or May each year.

The USG welcomes inquiries and new members. For further information, and the names of people to contact in your vicinity, write to:

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To become a member (except if you're in Britain or Ireland) send your name, address and \$6 to:

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
Membership includes receipt of the Newsletter. Individual Newsletter subscriptions are \$6; institutional subscriptions, \$12 per year.

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EDITORIAL COMMENT

The amount of interaction between progressive geographers in Chicago, Minneapolis, Valparaiso, Evanston, and Madison has increased greatly over the past three years. The cause of this growth is not particularly clear. Some would suggest that following the formation of a global umbrella organization like the Union of Socialist Geographers it was inevitable that smaller subunits, regional "cells", would emerge. Others have suggested that it has only been natural for socialist geographers working independently of each other to seek out like-minded associates in other cities and universities.



Has radical geography in the Midwest spread up or down the urban hierarchy? Does $K = 5$? $K = 7$? But this is not the right question. It never has been and it never will be. The real question is "How can progressive geographers work to disseminate critical perspectives about capitalist society; insights which can provide an effective theoretical tool in the practical struggle to change the world?" This issue of the Newsletter represents a small sample of the intellectual praxis of socialist geographers in the Midwest region.

There have now been three annual meetings of the Midwest region of the USG. Most of the papers and workshop reports contained in this issue were first presented at the Second Annual Meetings in Madison, April 14-16, 1979. In addition, the last three papers are from the previous year's meetings in Minneapolis. Among those participants in the Madison meetings whose work is not represented here are: Sean Hartnett, Al Gedicks, Abid Kureshi, Cornelius Loeser, Bill Bunge, John Chappell, Jr., John Rury, Jim Blaut, Jim Lyons and Gary Edelman. Nor could either that meeting or this Newsletter have appeared without the assistance of Greg Knapp, Howard Botts, Russell Kirby, Nicole Gotthelf, James Penn and many others. To all of them, my thanks.

Mark Garner

A DEDUCTIVE MODEL OF UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT

Richard Hansis
Valparaiso University

A work which has a spatial model of underdevelopment as a focus would seem to be of intrinsic interest to geographers. Lacking the attention which it deserves is the study of Franz Hinkelhamert and his Chilean colleagues. The work, The Dialectic of Unequal Development, (La Dialéctica del Desarrollo Desigual, Santiago, Chile: Centro de la Realidad Nacional, 1971) contains an analysis of the development-underdevelopment contradictions accompanied by a model of economic space which accounts for underdevelopment.

The study focuses on industrial capitalism, the first mode of production linked to continuous economic growth. This new mode, beginning in England towards the end of the eighteenth century, develops an expansionary force which conquers most of the world by the end of the nineteenth century. The new mode of production penetrated the world by selling finished goods and buying raw materials. These raw materials permitted an increase in industrial production greater than that possible through the use of raw materials produced in the industrialized country. They can be imported more cheaply than internally produced materials owing to the cheapening of transportation in the nineteenth century. The relationship which develops is that of a developed industrial center and a dependent raw material producing periphery.

Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage has been used to justify the international division of labor. The possibility of international exchange rests on the fact that production costs of different goods differ in different places. Specialization in production on the basis of comparative costs of production would always be advantageous to each country or region even in the case of absolute disadvantage, for one country. In order for the theory of comparative advantages to be the explanation for international trade, diversity in the conditions of production among countries and among regions has to be the exclusive reason for the existence of international trade. Conversely, if there were not a diversity in conditions of production among countries or regions, there would not be international trade.

In order to test this last point, a series of suppositions about economic space must be made. These suppositions are similar to but broader than those of von Thunen.

1. Suppose that economic space is homogeneous. In each place any necessary raw material can be produced under equal conditions.
2. Suppose an absolute mobility of the labor force and its ability to move to places where its work signifies the maximization of total production.
3. Suppose that only one or a limited number of goods can be produced at the same time in the same place.
4. Suppose that the transport of goods costs something. This is a supposition disregarded by Ricardo.
5. Suppose an equal distribution of technical knowledge. Each new technique is simultaneously available to everyone.
6. Suppose an equal distribution in the skill of labor.
7. As a consequence of all these previous suppositions, suppose that all the factors of production cost the same everywhere.

These suppositions eliminate any possibility for the existence of relative advantages of factors of production in space. They describe a situation in which production is maximized if classical competition holds and if all individuals acting in their own self-interest leads to a maximization of production.

If it were supposed that the scale of production had no effect on the cost of production, an international division of labor would never be developed. An arbitrary number of self-sufficient entities that could produce at equal costs would appear. In order for a division of labor to exist in homogeneous space, economies of scale would have to exist.

There are two types:

1. Suppose, then, that economies of scale and agglomeration effects of production of diverse goods (internal and external economies) exist.
2. Suppose that there are economies of scale with respect to the space occupied by different types of production. The costs of production drop in relation to the area that a set scale of production occupies in space. Occupying more space decreases costs.

With these two additional suppositions, automatic ordering of economic space, with an international division of labor in which no type of relative advantage interferes, is produced. Since different goods have different economies of scale, different sized centers of production which exchange goods with each other will come into being if total production is to be maximized.

The production of goods can be divided into two groups. Some require little space. These would be goods which are ordered in space primarily according to external and internal economies of scale. These goods, principally manufactured products and most minerals, have high scale elasticity and low spatial elasticity.

Other goods require more space. Agricultural goods, produced for food and for raw materials, have a low scale elasticity and high spatial elasticity.

Goods whose scale elasticity is greater than their spatial elasticity will be concentrated in production agglomerations while those goods with a spatial elasticity greater than scale elasticity will form peripheries which surround the agglomeration. Between the agglomeration and the periphery a continuous exchange of goods has to exist. This exchange implies transport costs. If production in the agglomeration has reached maximum scale economies, and if the economic space is sufficiently large, the rise in the costs of transport requires agglomerations in other places. It suffices that a significant number of products have reached maximum economies of scale. Thus, a network of agglomerations of production, each of them surrounded by its own periphery, would appear. If the production site of one good is determined, the principle of maximization of production determines the sites of the other goods. Exchange between an agglomeration and its periphery would reach an equilibrium. Once the equilibrium is established, all factors of production should have the same prices in all places. However, the concept of equilibrium can be no more than a reference point to measure disequilibria caused by the price mechanism.

By relaxing the rigid suppositions of homogeneous economic space, it is possible to approach an analysis of natural, i.e., physical, space. First, assume that labor lacks mobility. It is not possible to produce at the same costs as would occur in the case where labor mobility exists, lowering income from the factors of production. Technical progress will also cause changes in the scale and spatial elasticities of production. These changes would force sites of production to continually shift if maximization of production is to occur. Since industry is not completely mobile, differences in factor incomes will continually appear. Both the lack of labor mobility and the lack of mobility of installations lead to different factor incomes or location rent. Location rent does not in any way measure a contribution of the land factor, but it does reflect a disequilibria in economic space, a consequence of a non-produced good, not differences in the productivity of the factors.

In natural space raw materials and soil fertility are distributed randomly. The same technological and labor skill levels have differential productivity according to natural conditions. Diversity of natural conditions is added to the place which industrializes first as a factor determining where production sites will be located. The cost advantages which accrue due to diversity in natural conditions are what has traditionally been known as land rent.

Let us now see how centers and peripheries are located if the criterion of global maximization of production holds and if labor is completely mobile. Four major factors influence location.

1. Transport costs of raw materials to the center of production. The ratio of the weight of the raw material to the weight of the finished product are important.
2. Agglomeration economies in the established centers. In order for production to continue at these centers these economies have to be greater than the diseconomies which raw material transport entails.
3. Existing and available technology.
4. Labor skill.

If technology is not equal everywhere, then it will be impossible to achieve a spatial equilibrium. Spatial equilibrium would require the extension of technology, which belongs to the one-fifth of humanity who live in the developed world, to the entire world. In natural space land rent results as a consequence of the immobility of industrial installations (location rent) and in the chance distribution of raw materials (relative rent). Spatial equilibrium is possible if the entire available work force is employed at the same technological level.

The existence of location rent and relative rent is conditioned by comparative production advantages but these advantages do not explain the location of production. They cannot explain either the appearance and disappearance or the changes in location of production centers. They are only additional elements in the explanation. Comparative advantages can only explain differences in the participation of the factors of production in different places, but they cannot explain a disequilibrium in labor force employment and in the use of available technology. Disequilibria in natural space are characterized by long term unemployment in certain places, by the use of a backward technology, and by the lack of labor skills necessary for the employment of modern technology suitable for local environmental conditions. The responsibility for the existence of these phenomena is attributable to human activity and in no way can it be assigned to natural characteristics. The explanation of such activity will necessarily be the explanation for underdevelopment. The analysis of human practice which leads to spatial equilibrium will be the analysis of the possible ways for development of the underdeveloped world.

It is now possible to define what is understood by an equilibrated periphery. An equilibrated periphery is so with respect to equilibrium of economic space. A country is not underdeveloped if it is a periphery in equilibrium. When there is a spatial economic disequilibrium, the periphery will be in disequilibrium. This is an underdeveloped periphery. Underdevelopment occurs whenever a country or a region is inserted into the international division of labor by raw materials - manufactured goods exchange and when the employment of the entire labor force with suitable modern technology is impossible.

Not only is the theory of comparative advantage an inadequate theory for explaining underdevelopment, but it also serves an ideological purpose. The basis for comparative advantages rests not only on the chance character of natural space but also on inequality

of technological levels and imbalances in the skills of labor. Because people using the theory of comparative advantage treat these two reasons as analogous, they treat human practice as natural phenomena, taking from it its properly human character. If structural underemployment is an indicator of spatial disequilibrium, the including of technological inequalities in the theory of comparative advantage makes the discussion of spatial equilibrium impossible. The theory of comparative advantages can only indicate which of the backward techniques is relatively more advantageous. It only explains how to better take advantage of the disequilibrium. This is exactly what the dominant class of the peripheral, underdeveloped society does. The human practice which leads to underdevelopment is the relationship between the capitalists of the developed countries and the dominant class of the underdeveloped countries who cause and benefit from the appearance and maintenance of a periphery in disequilibrium. The importance of this human activity cannot be overemphasized especially in the light of theories which purport to explain underdevelopment by laziness or lack of entrepreneurial spirit.

* * *

FORMATION OF AN AAG SPECIALTY GROUP IN SOCIALIST GEOGRAPHY

Following recent changes in the organization of the AAG, a specialty group for Socialist Geography has been established. However, this group will only function if 100 AAG members check it off on their 1980 membership forms. Therefore, I strongly urge all readers who are members of the AAG to check off this group since it is likely to be less popular than many of the more conventional groups. There will be an organizational meeting at the 1980 AAG meetings in Louisville. For additional information contact:

Eric Sheppard
University of Minnesota

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The USG at the AAG

The next annual meeting of the North American section of the USG will be held in April 1980 in Louisville, probably on the weekend immediately preceding the start of regular sessions of the Association of American Geographers' annual meeting. Those wishing to present papers, organize workshops or make suggestions should contact the organisers: Neil Smith, Department of Geography, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218; or Phil O'Keefe, The Graduate School of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, MA 01610. It is hoped that one session in the AAG meetings will be available for presentation of some of the papers submitted.

PRIMATE CITY DEVELOPMENT IN COLONIAL BURMA

Yda Saueressig
University of Wisconsin

The impact of British colonialism on Burma's urban hierarchy has to be viewed within the context of the colonial capitalist mode of production and political structure of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The coastal orientation of an economy based on rice cultivation and export is of major importance in understanding the Primate City development.

In interpreting the colonial urbanization process of Burma, three models seem applicable within the context of world market development for agricultural and mineral commodities. The first model concerns transportation and was developed by Taaffe, Morrill and Gould, based upon their study of West Africa.¹ Transportation development and urban development in a colonial context is thought to follow a particular sequence. After an initial stage of scattered ports and an intermediate stage of port concentration, a final stage of complete interconnection of the waterway and railroad network is reached. Usually, at this stage, one major port city concentrates all the economic activities. The second model is based on Baldwin's hypothetical model of commodity production in newly settled regions.² Spatial organization and urban development is attributed to the labor, processing, and marketing characteristics of different agricultural staples. In the case of Burma, this model would seem to be particularly attractive since the Irrawaddy Delta of Lower Burma formed a true rice frontier.

The third model I would like to describe as a model of "colonial organization of space."³ The essential factor for understanding the urban development pattern concerns the colonial relationship between core and periphery. The territorial organization and transportation network, along with the urban system, are based on an export-import economy and reflects a colonial policy which basically ignored an indigenous system of internal exchange and political organization. Neither transportation and coastal forms, nor resource exploitation per se, form the crucial elements in urban growth. Instead, the essence lies in the economic relationship between mother country and colony under a nineteenth century capitalist mode of production.

Although the three models should not be viewed as mutually exclusive, it is believed that the emphasis placed on particular aspects of the colonial impact, transportation development, frontier agriculture, and "colonial organization of space," differs significantly enough to allow for testing of the various models. In doing so, I employ B.J.L. Berry's method of measuring proportionate growth of individual cities in an urban system.⁴ On the basis of city size distributions for different years during the period from 1872 to 1921, I was able to analyse the urban growth pattern in considerable detail.⁵ The major findings were as follows:

1. A pronounced pattern of primacy developed, particularly after incorporation of Upper Burma (1886) within the British colonial system, and the extension of the railroad network into the interior. Rangoon became the major port city and capital; while Mandalay, the original Burmese capital lost its political position and was reduced to mere provincial administrative status.
2. Secondary port cities such as Akyab, Bassein, Moulmein, and Tavoy, maintained or lost their positions dependent on the degree to which they became interconnected by rail with Rangoon, during the last part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. The timing of railroad construction seemed an important factor.
3. Original urban centers under the Burmese Kingdom such as Prome, Pegu, and Moulmein, lost ground soon after annexation of Lower Burma in 1852. This was primarily the result of British colonial policies with respect to indigenous craft production such as shipbuilding for instance. The loss of the indigenous administrative function also contributed to the decline.

4. Upper Burma experienced a complete transformation of the urban system after 1886. The loss of power by the Burmese king resulted in a breakdown of the redistributive economy and a loss of the position of Mandalay as political and administrative center after incorporation within the colonial empire. With the expansion of rice cultivation soon thereafter, de-urbanization of Upper Burma took place. Mandalay regained some of its position in the twentieth century as a railroad center. At the same time, however, other traditional towns were bypassed by the railroad and lost their positions.
5. The development of processing industries (rice milling) in the port towns and in some railroad towns in the interior may have had a slight effect on the urban growth pattern after 1900. However, during the Depression of the 1920s, the smaller businesses in the interior were the first to go, and no lasting effect of the processing industries in Burma was reflected in the urban growth pattern.

At this stage of the research, the findings strongly suggest that important consideration must be given to the political-economic framework within which colonial urban systems develop. Rather than viewing colonial urban patterns as simply a result of transportation technologies or frontier agriculture, a broader orientation, sensitive to the historical significance of a dependent colonial status within the international capitalist division of labor, is desired. This is well illustrated in the case of Burma.

Footnotes

1. Edward J. Taaffe, Richard C. Morrill, Peter R. Gould, "Transport Expansion in Underdeveloped Countries: A Comparative Analysis," Geographical Review 53:4 (1963): 503-529. This interpretation in some cases has led to extreme forms of "transportation determinism"; see for instance, D. Hilling, "The Evolution of a Port System: The Case of Ghana," Geography 275:62 (April, 1977): 97-105.
2. Robert E. Baldwin, "Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Regions," Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 24 (1956): 161-179. A treatment of Burma's economic development from this perspective can be found in Michael Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1974. Baldwin's hypothetical model has been widely applied in the interpretation of the urban development pattern of Colonial America and the differential pattern of development in the nineteenth century South.
3. See for instance, Akin L. Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria, 1968. For Burma, this interpretation is most clearly found in J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Theory and Practice, 1948.
4. B.J.L. Berry, "City Size and Economic Development; Conceptual Synthesis and Policy Problems, With Special Reference to South and Southeast Asia," in L. Jakobsen and V. Prakash, (ed.), Urbanization and National Development, Volume 1, 1971.
5. According to Berry's formulation, the "law of proportionate effect" states that: if the urban system forms an integral part of a "developed" economic system, then, the growth of the cities within the system is proportionate to their size at some initial date. In other words, the growth rate is the same for cities at each level in the hierarchy. Since the law states a functional relationship between city sizes at different dates, a regression analysis served as a method by which deviation from the "expected" growth could be calculated. Standardized residuals express the degree to which the growth is proportionate to initial size. In this way we can follow the pattern of growth for individual cities and for cities at different levels in the hierarchy. We can also relate the growth pattern to the expansion of rice cultivation and processing, transportation development, and colonial policy.

INSTITUTIONS AND THE MICRO-SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF POWER:
A WORKSHOP REPORT

9

James Penn
University of Wisconsin

There can be no question of writing the history of the different disciplinary institutions, with all their individual differences. I simply intend to map on a series of examples some of the essential techniques that were most easily spread from one to another. These were always meticulous, often minute, techniques, but they had their importance: because they defined a certain mode of detailed political investment of the body, a "new micro-physics" of power; and because, since the seventeenth century, they had constantly reached out to ever broader domains, as if they tended to cover the entire social body. (1)
(Michel Foucault)

The similar organization of space in factories, prisons, hospitals, and schools is certainly not a coincidence. For most people, such large, austere buildings laid out on a block plan with numbered rooms and identical or nearly identical floors one on top of another are familiar in at least one of these capacities. Our experience in these buildings tells us that their architectural similarities are even less striking than the similarities in the way they structure an environment to control and regulate the behavior of individuals. Whether a building's official style is designated Neo-Classical Revival, Beaux Arts, or a modern style; whether situated in a decaying downtown, in suburbia, or in a rural district; whether the building's verticality has been diminished under the influence of lower land values in peripheral locations resulting in the low-slung institutional equivalent of the ranch-style house ---these structures have the characteristic spatial qualities of rigid enclosure, rigorous partitioning, and functional integration. In this way, human behavior has become isolated, segmented, and dominated. It is possible today to be born, grow up, work, retire, and die, largely within the confines of such buildings and to be unaware of the social control exerted by them.

We know that these large, functional structures have not been with us forever, that they are a result of the modern, industrial age just as skyscrapers and automobiles are. But we sometimes mistakenly consider the processes of discipline and control effected by them to be natural and universal. We easily forget that such institutions were necessary creations of a system defined simultaneously by formal freedom of the individual and autonomous power of the state. The institutional state had its origins only two centuries ago. One can trace a broad trajectory of change from the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century in the more dynamic parts of western Europe and North America in which a traditional, community-based, proprietary society was transformed slowly into a modern, individualist, capitalist society. This change should not be conceived as being so absolute that we either exclude the possibility of the persistence of traditional elements in the modern world or deny the existence of aspects of modernity in earlier times. Arbitrary stage models of historical development such as those that emphasize "industrialization" do not convey the complex social and relational aspects of change. Capitalist social relations were only a part of the totality of social relations, and in a newly settled area such as North America with abundant, cheap land, this type of social relation, dependent as it was on wage labor, did not predominate until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. The continuing importance of petty proprietary elements in Europe throughout the century was no less dramatic. Most importantly, this change, if it is to escape being romanticized, must be seen in the context of the accumulation of capital, the separation of the worker from the means of production, the appropriation of his surplus value during the work process, the revolutionizing of the forces of production, and a renewal of the accumulation process. The transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism in which real control of the production process by the industrialist replaced the formal control exerted by the merchant was associated with the development of the city as an arena for production, social reproduction, infrastructural provision, and state intervention. The concept of social reproduction involves the way social relations,

activities, and institutions support and expand the current system. It is within this concept of social reproduction -- the biological, material, and cultural requirements of a society -- that we situate our subject-matter.²

An institution refers to aspects of both a physical structure and a social structure, and we intend the ambiguity of the word's meaning to stand. Our topic is not architecture or buildings in themselves, nor is it social structures or relations in vacuo. We are primarily interested in the way physical and social structures are articulated by the organization and use of space by a dominant class for purposes of disciplining and controlling a subordinate class. The buildings of interest to us here embody and express the relations of authority-subordination materially and symbolically. Materially, these institutions organize space to control the behavior of individuals within their confines. Symbolically, their exteriors and interiors present forms, shapes, and styles that express an ideology meant to preserve, protect, and expand the social system.

When workplace and residence coincided in a proprietary unit centered on the family, institutions as we know them could hardly be said to have existed. Birth, child-rearing, and basic education all occurred within the home. The fabric of life combining family and community was tightly woven. A livelihood might be learned in the family, or by attaching oneself to one's neighbors or relatives with whom one might live. Specialized institutions for the deviant or dependent did not exist. The poor, the sick, and the insane mixed indiscriminately in almshouses which were simple, spatially undifferentiated buildings. Those accused of a crime awaited trial in jails for short periods of time, but if convicted, they were banished or punished by fine, whipping, or hanging. Long periods of incarceration were unknown. Eighteenth century proto-institutions of almshouses and jails not only looked like ordinary family houses but were run like families. With no special dress code, or disciplined routine, the keeper and his family often took their meals with the inmates. Traditional means of regulating society were more important than formal mechanisms in the eighteenth century, and this is nowhere more clearly reflected than in these early institutions.³

This pattern changed rapidly in the first few decades of the nineteenth century as specialized institutions for the care of deviant and dependent populations developed. The North American case illustrates this trans-Atlantic change. The first mental hospital, McLean's, opened in 1818; the first reformatory, the New York House of Refuge, was founded in 1825; Massachusetts and New York created a network of poorhouses in the 1820s in response to the famous Quincy and Yates reports which recommended the elimination of virtually all outdoor relief; Ontario established the Provincial Penitentiary in 1835. But institutions for non-deviant populations also originated at this time, most notably the public schools. Tax-supported schools had existed before, but what was novel was a system of age-graded, spatially partitioned, routinely functioning institutions administered by specially trained experts. New York City's public education began in 1805 with the Free School Society, and the first state board of education was set up by Massachusetts in 1837.⁴

Whereas earlier the local community had taken care of those within its boundaries who needed care, the increasing geographic mobility of people required action of a broader kind. Many of the people who ended up in institutions represented a new group whose condition was created by changing productive relations: adolescents, dispossessed proprietors, and the unemployed; while others were a threat to social order. The poor held in Debtors' Prisons made up the bulk of the incarcerated population. Society defined a norm for behavior, which increasingly focused on employment, and thereby created a population of "deviants" who did not conform to this model of social order. An institutionalized population that had not existed before was formed by this process, and, in fact, was required for the preservation of the new order.

There did not occur a direct intervention of the state in the face of the destruction of traditional ways of caring for deviants and dependents. Most of the early institutions were private, voluntarist efforts in which reform of character received considerable emphasis. The earliest institutions treated the amalgamated problems of poverty, crime,

ignorance, and vice; they inevitably had charitable and religious objectives. Well-intentioned Dissenters in England, especially the Quakers, protested the Establishment by founding institutions to cure, not just to contain, the unfortunates of the system. The changing nature of the prison centered on a shift from corporal punishment with little confinement to mental punishment effected by incarceration. Early reformers of a religious bent such as Howard who had objected to corporal punishment and recommended instead the "total institution" for redirection of the individual via the awakening of his conscience, lived to see the day when mental forms of coercion exceeded physical ones in cruelty.⁵ A moralism that concentrated on reforming character by religious precept yielded to an environmentalism that concentrated on changing behavior. The restructuring of the environment by spatial segregation and isolation was supposed to accomplish this change. Humanitarian zeal eventuated in a theory of environmental determinism which was used to legitimate the intervention and manipulation of the state even though it had no empirical validity. (Reformation of character did not occur in the new institutions.) Institutions that superficially had been dismal failures were taken over by the state.⁶ Subsequent rationalization and hierarchical organization was accomplished by a professional bureaucracy employed by the state rather than by private, paternalistic interests. (Hospitals represented a partial exception to this shift from private voluntarism to public control, because a prosperous, cohesive professional group preceded their establishment rather than following it, as was the case with schools and mental hospitals.)

There are many institutions that we do not primarily associate with buildings, but which nevertheless enclose space in the built environment and often include buildings as important parts of their functioning. The enclosed space, associated buildings, and articulation of these features to the outside world illustrate some of these trends. Urban parks for the recreation, entertainment, and pacification of the work force represent this phenomenon well. The crowded, functional, rectangularly laid out, topographically smoothed area outside the park contrasts with the spacious, vegetated, rolling, irregularly surveyed "pleasure gardens" built from 1850 to 1900, best exemplified by Central Park in New York City. These unlit, flowerless parks of the late nineteenth century where pedestrian and vehicular traffic were separated gave rise in the early twentieth century to the "reform park" laid out on a rectangular basis, including Field Houses, good lighting, and flowers. Two new species of parks have developed since the 1930s: the recreational facility such as the sports club or complex, and the more recent "open space" park, including small lots, adventure playgrounds, and urban plazas. These two new types of parks reflect the narcissism, conformity, and self-discipline of the new professional and managerial groups, as well as the continuing need to integrate nature, identified more and more as non-productive areas, into the suburban landscape. Baseball and the "ball park" first became popular escapes in the antebellum period, but it was not until the late nineteenth century that amphitheatrical stadia began to resemble their Roman counterparts in structure and function. Football, with its violence, competition, timing, and gridded playing space, reflects today's society better than the relatively leisured, gentlemanly game of baseball, and it also more closely resembles its gladiatorial parallel in Rome. The tall, non-functional pillars alongside Soldier's Field in Chicago bring out this classical analogy well.

The changing role of museums in social reproduction would be a fruitful topic for critical examination considering the transcendent value of the subjects dealt with in these buildings for the modern world -- art, science, and technology. The large, stone museums of classical style located in metropolitan centers were built and meant to function in the heyday of industrial capitalism. Super-organized rooms and galleries are full of the loot plundered from all around the world, and enormous, domed spaces resonate with the self-confidence of the Victorian period. The modern museums, best exemplified by New York City's Museum of Modern Art, are a striking contrast in many ways. Steel and glass construction, sleek lines, informally but efficiently arranged rooms, and changing exhibitions characterize New York's Modern which was the prototype of the newer type of art museum. The planned coordination of the users' movements, the bewildering assault on

one's senses, and the possibility of relaxation in a sculpture garden populated with objects that emphasize the abundant powers of nature and womanhood. symbolize a phase of advanced capitalism in which manipulation, consumerism, and subjectivity predominate.¹⁰

We often bemoan the "institutionalization" of death. Death in a hospital or nursing home, embalment in a mortuary, burial in an individualized plot of ground, a last home in an ornate casket inside a water-tight box, are all specific historical features not universal patterns. We do not realize this because the subject of death has gone into the closet as sex has come out. There are important spatial aspects of cemetery and grave location and design, as well as the organization of space in buildings dealing with death, and an historical analysis of these topics could be very insightful (e.g. the transition from communal graves attached to churches and associated with charnel houses, Elsinore in Hamlet, to individual graves in dispersed cemeteries.)¹¹ The reality of art and death derive meaning at the highest ideological level, and we can only understand their importance if we avoid simplistic explanations based on stage models of changing modes of production. We must situate the symbolic levels broadly within the idea of social reproduction. Our ability to embed ideology within society without adopting either a purely "contextual" view (ideology mirrors social reality) or a purely "textual" view (ideology has an internal coherence) is the ultimate test of a sound structural theory.

This account so far has emphasized descriptive and narrative aspects of institutional space. We need to develop a theoretical explanation for the way in which the macro-spatial powers of the state (territorial sovereignty, war-making, defense) partly devolved on, partly complemented the micro-spatial powers of institutions. The close connection between factory organization and army organization gives us a leading principle. Marx compared the factory to an army in his discussion of "cooperation" in relation to the division of labor. "Cooperation", the bringing together in one place of a number of elements of the production process which were formerly spatially separated, joins with the technical division of labor, by which the production process was divided up into constituent parts, to yield gains in productivity. In the early period, these two factors were more important than the adoption of labor-saving machinery. Thus, early gains were a result of coercion and control of the labor force rather than technical innovation. The factory was not just a productive institution at this time, for the first factories had a paternalistic, reform aspect that makes it impossible to separate strictly production from reproduction. The Elizabethan bridewell or house of correction was a precursor of the early factory. The taint of this association was enough to cause the first generation of Lancashire workers to keep their children away from the new factories if they could.¹² A major question confronting the new prisons was whether or not production was a primary goal. Bentham's celebrated prison Panopticon, essentially a transparent circular cage housing inmates surrounding a guard tower, was meant to function also as a factory. (It was also to be used as a hospital where experiments with new medicines could be carried out.)¹³ In other words, the early institutions had not differentiated themselves enough so that we could clearly distinguish the productive and the reproductive institution. Hybrid types such as the factory-prison or the factory-hospital predominated.

The essential feature of these new institutions, which slowly began to differentiate themselves as being either productive or reproductive, was the disciplining and controlling of the labor force by the creation of what Michel Foucault calls "docile bodies". The body became at one and the same time an analyzeable body and a manipulable body, with growth in knowledge about the body and its functioning correlating with the coerced manipulation of its basic gestures. A "political anatomy" of the body was established which was also a "mechanics of power". Military discipline offered the model, and it is no coincidence that Frederick II, who was known for his well-trained regiments and long exercises, was obsessed with automata. As Foucault describes it, this discipline achieved its objectives by the art of distributing individuals in space, establishing temporal rhythms for activity, by creating personal and social evolutive patterns of development so that the "accumulation of time" can occur, and by combining all these forces into a

new composition. These characteristics are associated respectively with cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory disciplines, which were best symbolized by and often derived from the primarily military practices of drawing up tables, prescribing manoeuvre, imposing exercises, and arranging tactics.¹⁴

The first disciplinary characteristic of the distribution of individuals in space is of special interest here. This proceeds by four means: 1) enclosure 2) partitioning 3) siting 4) ranking. Enclosure is the process whereby a space heterogeneous to all others is closed in upon itself. Early institutions such as the prison duplicated the factory and army in the way they rigidly segregated themselves from the outside world, and these early institutions in turn duplicated the older models of the army barracks, the monastery, the palace, and the walled city. Partitioning involved the elementary location of individuals. This process resulted in the architectural creation of cells such that each individual had its own place and each place its own individual. ("Individual" refers to human and non-human elements.) In institutions, discipline imposes the analytical grid-space of Descartes' geometry in three dimensions, whereas in new towns and newly settled lands at the same time the two-dimensional equivalent, the rectangular land survey system, was superimposed upon the natural terrain. Siting required the creation of a functioning, useful space. Activities were coordinated by the coding of a space which architecture alone had left for different uses. Foucault believes that the French military and naval hospitals, especially those located at ports, set the pattern for this rigorous definition of space. Control over people, things, and commodities was necessary in "a place of desertion, smuggling, contagion: ... a crossroads for dangerous mixtures, a meeting-place for forbidden circulation." The articulation of elements onto a production machinery in the factories of the late eighteenth century extended and deepened these precedents. Ranking was required because the essentially interchangeable elements of discipline needed to be ordered into a pyramidically arranged hierarchy for purposes of control. Bodies are individualized by a location that does not give them a unique place but circulates them in a network of relations. The schools' ranking of students by age, worth, performance, and behavior is the best example of this. The different rooms in the elementary and secondary schools, the different places within the rooms, and the different floors of the building illustrate the spatial differentiation produced by this classification which was always intended as much for reasons of discipline as of efficiency. Thus, by a process of creating enclosed areas, architectural cells, functional places, and hierarchical ranks, an anatomy of power not only was imposed on the body but invaded it.¹⁵

The English poet John Clare was born, grew up, and lived in the open-field landscape of Helpston parish in the Soke of Peterborough from 1793 to 1832. His early poetry was full of images of the open fields, the limestone heaths, the level fens, and native springs and groves and birds. As a result of parliamentary enclosure in 1820, the old arable fields and communal grazing lands were divided up into parcels which were quickly fenced and hedged. Thoroughfares were built to integrate the area with the growing towns of Peterborough and Stamford, and old roads and country lanes that had circuitous routes or did not go anywhere went out of use. The environment of Clare's childhood was rapidly transformed as Helpston lost its isolation, its closed-in nature, and its distinctiveness. Clare's troubled poetry at the time reflected his inability or unwillingness to accept these changes. In 1832, he moved with his family to a cottage three miles northeast of Helpston, and he had melancholy forebodings about increasing alienation from the world of his past. In 1837, he was taken to an asylum at High Beech, Epping Forest. (His lunacy caused him to imagine himself variously as Byron, the prize-fighter Jack Randall, and Queen Victoria's father.) He spent the last twenty-seven years of his life in institutions that originated in and were required by a modern world to which he could not adjust.¹⁶

Footnotes

1. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison(New York:Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 139.
2. Patrick O'Donnell, "Industrial Capitalism and the Rise of Modern American Cities," Kapitalistate 6(1977): 91-128.
3. Michael B. Katz, "Origins of the Institutional State," Marxist Perspectives 1:4(1978), 6-22; David J. Rothmann, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 30-56.
4. Katz, op. cit.
5. Michael Ignatief, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp 44-79; Foucault, op. cit., pp 3-131.
6. Ignatief, op. cit., pp. 44-79; on institutions in relation to environmental determinism, see Rothmann, op. cit., pp. 82-85, 128-129, 133-134, 193-194, 212-214, 245-246, 251-252.
7. Katz, op. cit.
8. Galen Cranz, "Changing Roles of Urban Parks: From Pleasure Gardens to Open Space," Landscape 22(1978), 9-18.
9. Lewis Mumford, Sticks and Stones: A Study of American Architecture and Civilization(New York: Dover, 1924), p. 135; O'Donnell, op. cit.; Jean-Marie Brohm, Sport: A Prison of Measured Time(London: Ink Works Ltd, 1978), p. 74.
10. Carol Duncan and Alan Wallach, "The Museum of Modern Art as Late Capitalist Ritual: An Iconographic Analysis," Marxist Perspectives 1:4(1978): 28-51.
11. Philippe Aries, Western Attitudes Toward Death From the Middle Ages to the Present (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1974),passim.
12. Ignatief, op. cit., p. 32.
13. Foucault, op. cit., Part III(chapter 3) "Panopticism", pp. 195-228.
14. *ibid*, pp. 141-169.
15. *ibid*, pp. 141-149.
16. John Barrell, The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place, 1730-1840: An Approach to the Poetry of John Clare(Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press,1972), pp. 174-181.

* * *

Appetite is an instinct thoughtfully implanted by Providence
as a solution to the labor question.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary)

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
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RETHINKING SPACE:
A WORKSHOP REPORT

20

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In one of the workshop presentations, Mark Garner discussed the ideological basis of the claim that geography is the science of space. Proponents of this position use geometry and abstract space (the system of logical relations which allow us to describe space without reference to empirical observations) as fundamental tools and assumptions in their research. In this fashion, the concept of abstract space is usually "smuggled" into analysis in the form of analytic statements written in the language of formal science, primarily mathematics. However, abstract space is actually an historically conditioned and value-laden concept which does not provide the neutral framework for analysis that its proponents believe.

This may be shown by studying the evolution of humankind's perception of space and place. In pre-capitalist societies, ties to the land and to specific places were much stronger; locations had a personal and place specific meaning which was culturally tied to the mode of appropriating nature in non-commodity producing societies. However, with the development of commodity production under capitalism the drive for profits was manifested in two ways that necessitated the evolution of a universal metric for terrestrial space. First, the spatial division of labor became increasingly sophisticated with the maturation of the social division of labor, augmenting profits through comparative advantage, and promoting the development of methods of accounting for the costs of shipping goods between different locations. Second, the continual drive to reduce the monetary and temporal costs of circulation also required the development of precise measurements of distance. It was these requirements which promoted the ascendancy of a metric conception of distance, paralleling, with the rise of wage-labor, the metricization of time. This has been extended to encompass even the evaluation of human judgements in general, in models of spatial choice where metric distance is inserted as a parameter of preference.

Thus abstract space, as both a conceptual framework and an internalized structure of compulsions regulating movement in geographical space, has evolved as the result of a particular set of social relations (commodity production under capitalism), and is indeed the spatial corollary of the development of universal value forms through the monetary system. Abstract space, from this perspective, is therefore an "objective mode of appearance" of the behavior of human beings in terrestrial space under the domination of the regime of commodity production; a mode of comprehension socially appropriate to the analysis of the relationship between locations when the realization of place, the social appropriation of the useful properties of natural space, occurs through commodity exchange. The term spatialization indicates that abstract space as a theoretical object central to spatial analysis signifies not a thing, nor even a dimension of matter, but rather an objectified form of social practices expressed in things. It is a part of spatial specialization, mechanized production, and all the social and political structures accompanying this. Abstract space cannot then be separated from its social context, and use of this language in research leads to ideologically biased analysis for a number of reasons.

First, the concept of abstract space, being dependent on the evolution of society, cannot represent a neutral starting point for research. Rather one is starting from a position internal to the social forces being analyzed. Ignorance of this will lead to concealment of the power relations that made abstract space important, introducing a bias towards the status quo. Second, just as the money wage conceals the division of surplus between capitalist and worker, abstract space disguises the real inequalities of the social relations of production. In this way the ideology of spatial analysis parallels that of neo-classical economic theory. The formal equality of exchange relations under capitalism, which masks the real inequalities in production, parallels the formal equivalence and universality of abstract space. Third, the conception of man as a self-conscious evaluator of costs and distances comes from this same paradigm. Phenomenological critiques of the "inhuman" basis of this conception of behavior are partly misplaced since abstract space, as a mode of organizing and experiencing geographical distances, has become prevalent in our society. The important issue is to avoid the ideological pitfalls of working with abstract space.

Neither natural nor illusory, abstract space reflects in thought a potential mode of organizing the appropriation of terrestrial space which is embodied in one particular set of production relations. As a basic concept in spatial analysis it is both normative and ideological. Yet, expressing as it does an objective potentiality for society, abstract space may still have some future value. Whether abstract space is an appropriate vehicle for either the conceptual or practical organization of social behavior across natural space is clearly a question of practice rather than theory.

Eric Sheppard concentrated on one element brought out by Mark Garner's critique; the utilitarian conception of behavior used by spatial analysts. This paradigm essentially is based on the argument that people act in such a way as to maximize the utility of their actions. Defined in the broadest sense, this is virtually a tautology. However, the definition used in practice is subtly narrower; utility is defined by the profits or material benefits accruing directly to the individual. As a result, utility maximizing behavior becomes equated frequently with egoistic behavior.

Two major justifications have been made to support such a view of human behavior; that humankind is "naturally" egoistic, and that it would be good for society if people did act egoistically. The first position has little basis in fact, while the second is based on a neo-classical view of a type of non-monopolistic capitalism that is by necessity obsolete. Even the fact that people do act egoistically does not support this view of human nature, since actions and preferences are conditioned by social relationships and cannot be considered independently from these.

In the light of such arguments, assumptions that treat spatial behavior as a rational trade-off of distance costs against destination opportunities essentially are assuming that the way people behave is the only feasible model of behavior. This is a clear ideological bias in favor of the status quo, and negates arguments asserting the value-free nature of such studies, and of the conception of space underlying them.

In addition, it is conventionally assumed that the parameters of utility are either given a priori, or determined empirically from peoples' actions. Both of these strategies, however, incorporate a status quo bias. First, to say that utilities are given is to assert that preferences are exogenous. However, peoples' actions and beliefs are conditioned and limited by the society in which they live. To assert the autonomy of preferences is to state either that the researcher has a better (different) idea of what forms preferences, or else that he draws on current norms. In either event there is a danger of neglecting the way society conditions choice, which makes criticism of such restrictions impossible. On the other hand, methods of revealing preferences from observed behavior are also fraught with difficulties. To interpret choice as preference necessitates assuming both an ability to choose and also the existence of real alternatives between which the choice is made. The second presumption is particularly difficult since the limits to choice imposed by society are so pervasive that they are virtually impossible to eliminate. In addition, the most critical restrictions are often not faced in day-to-day behavior, and thus preferences cannot be gauged. For example, it is feasible to observe whether a customer prefers one store over another, but it cannot be determined whether she would prefer to be in another type of social system since that choice is effectively not available. Revealed preference is best for day-to-day decisions, but this is precisely the type of behavior that takes place within the context of a certain social structure, and does not raise questions about the validity of that structure.

Finally, the whole utility maximizing approach equates use value and exchange value, following the neo-classical paradigm. While the labor theory of value is not airtight, it is certainly true that goods cannot exchange at equivalent use values. It would not be worth trading if people received the same value as they traded away. On the other hand, by equating the two, utility becomes the same as personal material gain. If it is then asserted that this is the goal of spatial choice, the mode of behavior, and the society whose continued existence

depends on that mode of behavior, will be reinforced. In this way egoistic models of spatial interaction help support the current state of society.

The solution to this need not be outright rejection of behavioral models or utility theory. However, what is needed is the exploration of non-egoistic behavior, the examination of models of collective behavior, and the construction of normative views of the situation under alternative social structures. It is only from a position which possesses real alternatives to the present order that an effective criticism of the status quo can be mounted.

* * *

ANNOUNCEMENT FROM BRITAIN

- 1) ANTIPODE Representative for Britain is now Malcolm Forbes. Contact at:

26 Teesdale Road
Leytonstone,
London, E11

01-989-9561

Also, to those who have not received their back orders - apologies - but they are stuck in transit between the U.S. and Britain.

- 2) The IBG Committee has rejected our applications - on the basis that they were late. Therefore, there will be no official event at the IBG. But there will be USG workshops and Sessions running during the evenings.


Suggested topics:

USG / Political Practice
Regional Policy / Technical and Economic Futures
Empirical Practice / Teaching

Any Others Welcome!

Jo Foord

* * *



THE CAPITALIST STATE:
A WORKSHOP REPORT

23

Mickey Lauria
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In advanced capitalist society the state provides an institutional context for many geographical processes. The process of urban redevelopment clearly operates within the institutional context of the state. Geographers, however, have virtually ignored the state by assuming either that geographic processes operate in a political and institutional vacuum or that the pluralist theory of the state has universal applicability.

Theories of the state can be analytically divided into two different basic groups. Studies of the 'State in Capitalism' - Pluralist theories that are primarily concerned with explaining the observed functions of the state in that society; and studies of the 'Capitalist State' - Marxist theories that focus, in addition to those observable functions, on the form of the capitalist state in a dynamic sense. Both groups agree that the general role of the state in advanced capitalist societies is the protection and reproduction of the social structure in so far as this is not achieved by the automatic processes of the economy. These groups diverge when expressing the degree and methods of regulation necessary to maintain that social structure.

Pluralist theories are based in the political tradition of liberalism. They see the state as a pluralistic aggregation mechanism whose agencies, programs, and legislation are substantive responses to the demands and interests of competing groups. The state corresponds to a political marketplace where competing interest groups bargain for surplus value. The pluralist theories that are familiar to geographers are: the state as a supplier of public or social goods, the state as social engineer, and the state as arbiter of intergroup conflict. These theories are not full-blown theories of the state. They all reduce their discussions to a particular function the state appears to be performing which has bearing on their research topic. This prevents them from examining the role of the state as a whole and the relations between the various functions of the state. These theories are basically atomistic theories which place total emphasis on surface description of state activities. It is in this sense, that they operate within the ideological guise that these institutions and activities pose.

Marxist theories generally see the role of the state as existing to protect the continued stability of the economic system, mode of production, and attendant social relations, as well as to provide the economic stimulus and means for accumulation that will maintain a viable private economy. These theories combine the particulars of the pluralist theories within a specific theoretical construct - that of "dialectical and historical materialism." Virtually all marxist treatments of the state begin with the fundamental observation that the capitalist state broadly serves the interests of a capitalist class. They all try to answer two complementary questions: Why does the state serve the interests of the capitalist class? and How does it function to maintain and expand the capitalist system? Theories differ primarily because these questions are formulated at different levels of abstraction, with different methodological principles, and sometimes with different emphases. The different Marxist theories of the state discussed are:

1. Ideological (Habermas, 1976; Wolfe, 1974)
2. Instrumentalist (Sweezy, 1942; Miliband, 1969)
3. Structuralist (Althusser, 1971; Poulantzas, 1971)
4. Claus Offe's Specification (1975)
5. Derivative (Altvater, 1973; Hirsch, 1978)

6. Political Class Struggle (Esping-Anderson, et al., 1976; Wright, 1978)

This paper discusses these theories in a fashion that displays an accumulative development. It is the final two theories, the materialist and the political class struggle that promise the most in the way of providing the context for urban redevelopment in the United States. It is James O'Connor's Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973) which is the concrete specification of these theories to the case study of the United States today.

O'Connor develops a structural theory of public finance by analyzing the state and its functions as an integral element in the accumulation process. This theory elucidates the relationships between the private and state sectors of the economy and between private and state spending. Two basic theses develop from O'Connor's analysis. His first thesis is that growth of the state sector and state spending is functioning increasingly as the basis for the growth of the monopoly sector and total production and vice versa. In other words, the socialization of the costs of social investment and social consumption increases over time and increasingly is needed for profitable accumulation of monopoly capital. This is due to the increase in the social character of production (specialization, division of labor, interdependencies, education, etc.) which either prohibits or renders unprofitable the private accumulation of constant and variable capital, and the fact that the growth of the monopoly sector is accompanied by unemployment, poverty, economic stagnation, etc. Therefore, the state, to ensure mass loyalty and maintain its legitimacy, must meet the various demands of those who suffer the costs of this economic growth. In essence, the supply of social capital creates the demand for social expenses and, therefore, the importance of the budget depends on the volume and indirect productivity of social capital and the volume of social expenses. Whether the growth of productive capacity runs ahead of or behind the growth in demand depends on the composition of the state budget. This then demands a class and political analysis of the determinants of that budget. The second basic thesis is that the accumulation of social capital and social expenses is a contradictory process which creates tendencies toward economic, social and political crises. This is so for two basic reasons. First, although the state has socialized more and more capital costs, the social surplus continues to be appropriated privately. This creates the structural gap between state expenditures and state revenues -- the fiscal crisis. Second, this fiscal crisis is exacerbated by the private appropriation of state political power for particularistic ends. Specific interest groups make claims on the budget for various kinds of social investment which are processed through the political system. This second thesis again directs research to political and class analysis.

In summary, O'Connor's theory holds that the state is a distinct set of political relationships which do not flow directly from the production relations. The state cannot be reduced simply to economic class relationships, but it does serve a clear class function. The class relations are in fact predicated on the state's partial autonomy. The state both enforces the market and supercedes it where the market produces destabilizing political repercussions. The state's fiscal crisis expresses the contradictions between the state's political and economic functions, between accumulation and legitimacy. In other words, the fiscal crisis is the manifestation of the contradiction between the basically social nature of production, with all its corresponding state activities, and the private appropriation of political and economic surplus value.

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THE POLITICS OF HOUSING: LONDON IN THE 1880s

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The provision of healthy and adequate shelter was for late Victorian English society not simply a practical problem, but a pressing political issue as well. In the fall of 1883, and until the issue simply withered away near the end of the decade, the housing of the working classes became, for the first time, the major social question. Social reform is a functional imperative of civil society. Therefore, it is necessary to situate the housing crisis within the context of middle class fears which arose from the perceived breakdown of the class relations of industrial capitalism. As suggested by Gareth Stedman Jones, it is necessary to excavate the "mental landscape within which the middle class could recognize and articulate their own anxieties about urban existence."¹ However, it is also the contention of this paper that it is precisely because Victorian politicians and social reformers were unable to step outside the ideological and economic imperatives of class rule that they failed adequately to comprehend or resolve the root causes of the housing problem.

On the surface, the crisis appears to have been caused by the failure of the housing market to provide an adequate supply of low cost lodgings in locations that were accessible to working class jobs. Furthermore, the housing shortage was all the more acute because of the demolition of old housing stock caused by railway construction; dock expansion; the transformation of formerly residential areas into warehousing, workshop, and office quarters; tremendous increases in urban land values; and street clearance or sanitation improvements. Other factors accentuated both poverty and social unrest: the persistent agricultural and trade depression of the 1880s, rural and foreign immigration into London, and the series of particularly hard winters. Finally, the relationship between the casual labor power market, low wages, and the effective demand for housing appears to have been critical. However, it is the intention of this paper to combine these partial explanations and recast them upon a different theoretical terrain. Instead of demonstrating that the London housing crisis reflected only the brutal subordination of the reproduction of labor power to the imperatives of capital accumulation, a form of domination inherent to the capitalist mode of production, this paper will attempt to delineate the changing material and symbolic meaning of housing to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat during the transition from competitive industrial capitalism to its monopoly phase. For the housing question was the point of ideological and political embarkation into welfare statism and "municipal socialism." Consequently, the way in which this issue was displaced and then rearticulated upon a new level of social intelligibility and actions is a critical issue for understanding and changing the present trajectory of Late Capitalism.

As Marx suggested, "mankind always sets itself only such problems as it can solve." However, it must be regarded as even more amply true, that no ruling class ever sets for itself a problem which cannot be solved within its own conditions of existence. Thus, any close investigation of the accounts of the housing crisis which appeared in the popular and political press of the ruling class should reveal the content and limitations of bourgeois ideology. A housing crisis of massive proportions and an economic depression which threatened the very foundations of English liberalism comprised the objective reality. But the discourse about this structural reality confined the housing crisis within limits acceptable to ruling class consciousness; its analysis of this crisis and proposals for meeting it were thus compatible with the interests of that ruling class. With the Ricardian system, mid-Victorian economists inherited the pessimism implicit in the Malthusian population doctrine, the wages fund theory, and a hedonistic social psychology. In a society burdened with poverty and deprivation, this self-serving attitude towards human initiative bolstered fears that eleemosynary acts would result in the pauperization of the lower classes. The view that the commercial principles of political economy were lawful and unchanging had been an essential asset for the destruction of the legal protections of the feudalistic "moral economy." But, as Helen Lynd has pointed out, in abolishing the forms of mutualistic or paternalistic authority inherited from the past the English bourgeoisie was actually creating new authorities to reinforce individualism. Although Victorian society may have mastered the "conditions of freedom by defining them negatively," they actually deployed their positive constitutive powers to generate a particular type of society which was suitable to the functioning of industrial capitalism.²

The dominant emphasis of housing reformers prior to the eighties was upon moral rather than

environmental factors. Although social reformers may have had a sincere concern and compassion for the victims of the housing crisis, their reform projects were actually critical elements in the larger economic and political strategies of class rule. Thus the dogma of the individual moral responsibility of social outcasts for their own condition reinforced the essential social principle of blaming the victim. However, the data gathered by ministers, reporters, bureaucrats and early social scientists during the crisis convinced many Victorians that there were certain environmental circumstances which were bound to vitiate any attempt at moral reform. Thus during the 1880s moralists and environmentalists battled one another in establishing the causes of poverty and social deviancy; but by the end of the decade, it is clear that environmental solutions to social problems were those which were most widely asserted. If on the one hand, the acceptance of materialistic explanations of poverty seemed to transfer responsibility, at least partially, from the victim to society, they also opened the door to those "scientific" and bureaucratic strategies of curing social ills through the direct intervention and manipulation of the poor.

The biologism and social darwinism implicit in environmental theorizing received its clearest formulation in the theory of urban degeneration. For many patriotic minded members of the ruling class, the physical degeneration of the working class threatened England's industrial productivity, her military strength, and the possibilities for economic success in the competition among the "fittest" nations for shares in the world market. For the worker, the devastating impact of ill health upon the household economy was an obvious and painful reality; to the bourgeoisie, illness appeared as an annoying drain upon the local poor rates. Further, capital has always been interested in the quantitative and qualitative reproduction of its labor force; for the worker represents human capital. Mistaking the class interest of the ruling elite for an apolitical national interest, the Radical Program of the Liberal Party argued that "it is in the interest of all the community that the workmen should become a better instrument of production."

For the propertied classes, one of the most distressing aspects of the housing crisis was the discovery that the "respectable" and the "criminal" elements of the poorer classes were not physically separate from each other, but rather highly mixed together. As Marx had observed in Capital, "the better-off part of the working-class, together with the small shopkeepers and other elements of the lower middle class, falls in London more and more under the curse of these vile conditions of dwelling." Consequently, it was not simply the "worthless" poor who were confined to the abysmal conditions of East London slums, but also the "workless," the "thriftless," and even the "industrious" who were being driven by the housing shortage into the tainted moral and physical atmosphere of the one-roomed household. Therefore, Engels was clearly correct when he wrote the following in The Housing Question: "What is meant today by housing shortage is the peculiar intensification of the bad housing conditions of the workers ... And this housing shortage gets talked of so much only because it is not confined to the working class but has affected the petty bourgeoisie as well." Victorian attitudes about the lower classes tended to divide the workers into three different groups. One group, the respectable working class, was capable of tremendous social improvement, while the residuum of demoralized laborers had long since sunk into the irretrievable depths of depravity. However, in between these two groups lay a substantial portion of the population which was capable of moving in either direction. It was because the housing crisis alerted the bourgeoisie to the jeopardized condition of this group that it elicited such a dramatic public response. According to Andrew Mearns, "one of the saddest results of this over-crowding is the inevitable association of honest people with criminals." For Cardinal Manning the most threatening aspect of the housing shortage was that it "drives multitudes into the dangerous classes." For the staid and repressed middle class it seemed only natural to assume that the debauchery of the "criminal classes" would infect the industrious but vulnerable poor. According to both popular and informed opinion, "the lowest element sets the tone for East End existence." In the even more suggestive phrase of Mearns, "this terrible flood of sin and misery is gaining upon us."³ Associated with this view of the homogenization of the working class was another nightmare which mobilized the ruling class. Housing reform was quickly accepted as a useful weapon to fend off social revolution. It was not simply a matter of bourgeois sensitivity to the poor increasing as their social conscience matured. As pointed out by McGregor, "middle class consciences had to become more widely sensitive as working class teeth became sharper."⁴

Combined with the newly discovered residential mixing of the working classes, the possibility of collective action was too great a threat to the ruling class during a period of economic hardship and crisis. G.S. Reaney spoke for his class when he asked: "Who knows what impulse may seize them, these inarticulate thousands and millions, when once they feel their own power?" In an imaginary conversation with the Queen which Punch depicted in order to clarify the exigencies of the housing crisis for its readers, Sir Charles Dilke was shown responding positively to Victoria's comment that housing reform was the "safest mode of protecting our present constitution" and "the best, if not the only, method of nipping Communism in the bud." Even more explicitly, it was Joseph Chamberlain who posed the blunt question: "What ransom will property pay for the security it enjoys?"

In the course of the nineteenth century, the social distance between capital and labor was reified in the ever increasing physical distance between the social classes. It was in London that this process of segregation matured most rapidly. As the East-West dichotomy rigidified, it became increasingly axiomatic that "civilization begins at Oxford Circus." The separate "colonies" of the poor removed these sources of political and emotional irritation from the sight of the rich, only to be rediscovered in the journalistic accounts of adventuresome travellers in the "undiscovered country of the poor." Initially this vacant space within the imaginations of the Victorian ruling classes was filled with "altruistic geopolitical observations on the role of isolation in the perpetuation of a different way of life."⁵ In the 1880s, however, as the social determinants of residential differentiation were perceived to increasingly polarize around the hostile relationship between capital and labor, this imagery of spatial isolation became increasingly threatening. The "two nations" whose existence Disraeli had decried in Sybil and Engels had decried in The Condition of the Working-Class in England were gradually transformed from "spiritual communities" into "warring tribes." The desertion of the poor by the wealthier class was a popular explanation of the dangerous social circumstances. According to prevalent Victorian ideology, poverty among the residuum was regarded as a natural consequence of their intensity of interaction and mutual contamination, a condition which could only be disrupted by the "latent association" and elevating influences of the better classes. During the 1880s, social work, university settlement movements, home missionary activities, compulsory education, and (less commendable even to the rich) "slumming" all provided alternative vehicles to residential propinquity for reconnecting the severed social realities of the rich and the poor. Born of class antagonisms, socially exclusive neighborhoods functioned to reduce, as well as express class hostilities by lessening the visibility of exploitation. In so doing, social segregation functioned most critically to perpetuate an information gap which was especially painful and problematic to the ruling class during periods of economic crisis and social turmoil. It was into this class guf that the professional statistician and bureaucrat was first inserted.

The Victorian belief in the "dynamic power of mere information" was less a reflection of the scientific validity of the information that these embryonic social sciences generated than of the power to define and manipulate which they wielded in the service of the capitalist state. In the Victorian city, the preferred geometry of the social classes was privacy for the "better" classes, visibility for the working classes, and segregation for them both. Exposure to the regenerative power of the public gaze was the aim of the social sciences and also facilitated coercive surveillance by the state authorities. The information and expansionary imperatives of industrial capitalism demanded the measurement of human capital no less than natural resources. It was the "new urban gentry" of state professionals which functioned to maintain the instruments and records of a society which was increasingly organized to contend with the problems of "measured poverty." This form of covert oppression which makes marginal people available to the political and economic system has always been a part of the secret history of the social sciences.⁶ It was his desire to refute the recent revelations of housing reformers of the abysmal living conditions of the London poor that led Booth to commence his pioneering sociological study of London. Organizations like the Statistical Society of London and the Charity Organization Society attempted to rationalize the administration of institutional relief and to dispense with charity. According to Alfred Marshall, "Being without the means of livelihood must be treated, not as a crime, but as a cause for uncompromising inspection and inquiry."

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the housing crisis was that it initiated an important

and dramatic change in traditional attitudes towards government and social reform. The Welfare State is an integral product of industrial capitalism and is concerned, most fundamentally, with its victims. Welfare policies function to allow the continued existence of capitalism by concealing and medicating its most visible casualties without altering any of its essential characteristics. However, to notice only the reactive and ex post facto characteristics of the Welfare State would be to overlook some of its most significant and positive features. By uniting economic and political objectives in the explicit and socially legitimated policies of the state, welfare statism functions to strengthen capitalist society and to reestablish social order on a fundamentally new foundation. In his book The Eternal Slum, A.S. Wohl focuses upon the ideological debates between housing reformers and therefore tends to present the general development of social consciousness as the prime moving force in the resolution of the housing crisis. He is incapable of recognizing the unconscious, structural constraints to social action within which all these reform proposals are situated, the implicit assumptions which they all accept. Nevertheless, Wohl correctly identifies the most important consequence of the crisis as the transition in political thinking from negative to positive solutions to the housing question. Previously, "so long as men concentrated upon 'houses unfit for human habitation' and upon matters of drainage and disease, the response to the housing question would always be a negative one - a 'pull down' rather than a building up solution." Therefore, according to Wohl, there is a much shorter distance separating the Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1885, council housing, and the modern Welfare State; than that which separates these political responses from their mid-Victorian predecessors. What Wohl fails to see, however, is that this change in philosophies constituted not a commitment to the elimination of social injustice, but rather a new willingness of the capitalist state to intervene deeper and deeper into the personal concerns and problems of the citizen precisely in order to disguise and avoid confronting the economic causes which necessitated that intervention. In this fashion it is the ability to identify and define, as well as create, the social relationships of modern society that has given capitalism its incredible "staying power." The ability to formulate the problem and also to identify the "correct solution constitutes one of the most priceless weapons of "symbolic" capital. In fact, the reform initiated by the "powerful and accurate portrayal of overcrowding within the house," was simply a precondition for the direct intervention of social control mechanisms into the private lives of the working class.

As pointed out by Engels, "the capitalist order of society reproduces again and again the evils to be remedied." Crisis prone and driven by the necessity to surmount barriers to capital accumulation, barriers produced by the self-expansion of capital, the survival of capitalism demands that the requirements of capital dominate labor not only in the work process, where surplus value is appropriated, but with respect to the very definition of the quality of life in the consumption sphere, where the value is realized and made available for reinvestment. Under competitive industrial capitalism, social relationships for most segments of the population, as well as their spatial articulation in the infrastructure of the city, were dominated by the meaning of city life in the production process. Only with the rise of finance capital, tremendous technological breakthroughs achieved during the second industrial revolution, the qualitative increase in the productive forces achieved through the production of commodities by means of commodities, the decline of competitive pressures in the monopolizing sectors of the economy, and the growth of the workers' movements did consumption activities begin to acquire the social meaning they possess today. Hence, cities today are consumption artifacts, monuments to corporate accumulation, rather than "workshops" for production. Thus the social articulation of capital and labor, production and consumption, which emerged during the final decades of the nineteenth century was a product of the transition towards a "consumer society." Pressures towards the immiseration of the working classes were gradually changed into the illusion of superfluity through the use of need creation to foster effective demand, maintain social scarcity, and rationalize consumption.⁷ The emergence of modern social areas in cities reflects the reification of individual status in housing consumption and the emergence of political and economic institutions which maintain the spatial integrity of residential patterns based upon the differentiation of consumption classes and the political struggle to defend housing values.⁸

Industrial capitalism, with the advent of the factory system, forced a separation between the place of work and the place of reproduction and consumption. The "employment linkage" created by the destruction of domestic industries is really simply the spatial corollary of

the separation of the direct producer from the means of production and the real subordination of labor to capital. This spatial separation of life activities displaced many elements of class struggle from the point of production to the point of reproduction and socialized consumption. Thus, the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw urban class conflict move towards a more peaceful, fragmented and institutionally circumscribed phase as the interests of workers were reasserted upon a new terrain which had been generated within the imperatives of capital.

Both the Public Works Loan Act of 1879 and Sir Sidney Waterlow's Chambers and Offices Act of 1881 were designed to assist the workman in buying his own house. As pointed out by Engels in The Housing Question, this government endorsed policy has functioned to strengthen the principle of private ownership among the working class. The growth of owner-occupancy has been largely irrelevant in its impact upon capitalist property relations, with the broad distribution of wealth only functioning to obscure the continued social polarization in the ownership of capital. Because housing is a complex commodity which is long lasting, immobile, subject to high transaction costs, a multiple-use necessity, and capable of storing wealth in the form of its potential resale value, the home owner has been especially susceptible to political and economic manipulation.⁹ It has been the accumulative potential of domestic property that has given credence to the bourgeois myth that the working class can be converted into capitalists through home ownership. Although housing accumulates and facilitates the private appropriation of socially generated increments of value, it does not exchange against labor power, it does not produce, and consequently does not function as capital. Thus, it is rather as Engels suggested that workers "become home-owners not so much in their own interests as in the interest of capitalists;" since home ownership functions to obscure the fundamental cleavage between labor and capital, promote the subdivision of the working class, and facilitate the ideological integration of workers into the capitalist ethic of "possessive individualism." Ultimately it was this "suburban solution" which fueled the incredible economic growth during the middle decades of the twentieth century.¹⁰ With home activities overwhelmingly a form of consumption, the dichotomization of space into public and private spheres has been associated with the social production of privatized individuals who situate their needs and frustrations within the realm of commodity consumption rather than in terms of the quality of their workplace experience.

In the final analysis, it is perhaps because of the relationship between the housing crisis of the eighteen eighties, the rise of Welfare Statism, and the changing ideological and practical meaning of socialism that the transformative conjunctures of the late nineteenth century continue to be of such importance to the present. During this period, the worker's movement itself accepted capitalism as a given reality and began to situate its demands within, rather than outside, its oppressive confines. Economistic demands for wage increases, realizable if not structurally imperative to corporate capitalism, were substituted for revolutionary social change. No longer were the quality of life, the collective control over productive existence, and the direct democracy of associated producers the defining characteristics. To most people, socialism became simply associated with the provisionment of goods and services to the victimized casualties of capitalist society. Continuing to focus its demands upon the point of production even when many political issues were being organized around the sphere of consumption, this policy functioned to alienate and exclude from participation in progressive movements many of societies' most abused members: women, minorities and the unemployed. If as is being suggested here radical politics in advanced capitalist countries has still not effectively dealt with the social and structural changes which first surfaced during the housing crisis of the late nineteenth century, we can at least be assured that the problem still awaits our redress. For as pointed out by Frederick Engels:

In reality the bourgeoisie has only one method of settling the housing question after its fashion - that is to say, of settling it in such a way that the solution continually poses the question anew.

FOOTNOTES

1. Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London, Harmondsworth, 1976; D. Ward, "The Early Victorian City in England and America: On the Parallel Development of an Urban Image," in European Settlement and Development in North America, Toronto, 1978.

2. Helen Lynd, England in the Eighteen-Eighties, London, 1968; E.P. Hennock, "Poverty and Social Theory in England: The Experience of the Eighteen Eighties," Social History 1 (1976).

3. The majority of quotations appearing in this paper are taken from contemporary debates over housing legislation which appeared in the major popular and political press. Among those journals surveyed were: Builder, Contemporary Review, Fortnightly Review, National Review, Nineteenth Century, Pall Mall Gazette, and Punch. Important tracts, such as Andrew Mearn's The Bitter Cry of Outcast London, were also reviewed. For a complete listing of the relevant articles written during the housing crisis see A.S. Wohl, The Eternal Slum, London, 1977.

4. O.R. McGregor, "Social Research and Social Policy in the Nineteenth Century," British Journal of Sociology 8 (1957); Ruth Glass, "Urban Sociology in Great Britain: A Trend Report," Current Sociology IV (1955); and Peter Keating, "Introduction," in Into Unknown England, 1866-1913, Manchester, 1976.

5. H.J. Dyos, "The Slums of Victorian London," Victorian Studies 11 (1967); D. Ward, "Victorian Cities: How Modern?" Journal of Historical Geography 1 (1975); P. Malcolmson, "Getting a Living in the Slums of Victorian Kensington," London Journal 1 (1975); D. Olsen, "Victorian London: Specialization, Segregation, and Privacy," Victorian Studies 17 (1974).

6. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, New York, 1977; idem, The Birth of the Clinic, New York, 1973; Michael Ignatief, A Just Measure of Pain, New York, 1978.

7. Michel Aglietta, "Phases of U.S. Capitalist Expansion," New Left Review 110 (1978); Mike Davis, "'Fordism' in Crisis," Review 2 (1978).

8. David Gordon, "Capitalist Development and the History of American Cities," in Marxism and the Metropolis, New York, 1978; idem., "Capitalism and the Roots of Urban Crisis," in Fiscal Crisis of American Cities, New York, 1977; David Harvey, "Class Structure in a Capitalist Society and the Theory of Residential Differentiation," in Processes in Physical and Human Geography, London, 1975; idem., "Labor, Capital, and Class Struggle around the Built Environment in Advanced Capitalist Societies," Politics and Society 6 (1976); and P. O'Donnell, "Industrial Capitalism and the Rise of Modern American Cities," Kapitalistate 6 (1977).

9. David Harvey, Society, The City and the Space-Economy of Urbanism, Washington, D.C., 1972; P. Saunders, "Domestic Property and Social Class," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 2 (1978); H. Molotch, "Capital and Neighborhood in the United States," Urban Affairs Quarterly 14 (1979); Daniel Luria, "Wealth, Capital and Power: The Social Meaning of Home Ownership," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 7 (1976).

10. Richard Walker, The Suburban Solution: Urban Geography and Urban Reform in the Capitalist Development of the United States, Unpublished Ph.D., The Johns Hopkins University, 1976; idem., "The Transformation of Urban Structure in the Nineteenth Century and the Beginnings of Suburbanization," in Urbanization and Conflict in Market Societies, Chicago, 1978.

Note: Since preparing this essay in December, 1978, three other important papers on the London housing crisis of the 1880s have been brought to my attention. They are: Damaris Rose, "Housing Policy, Urbanization and the Reproduction of Labor Power in Mid-Nineteenth Century Britain: A Reappraisal," Unpublished University of Toronto Master's Research Paper, 1978; David Weinberg, The Social Relations of Living, London, 1830s-1880s: The Dialectics of Urban Living and City Form, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974; and John Foster, "How Imperial London Preserved its Slums," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 3 (1979).

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The culmination of the meetings this year was a talk by David Harvey in the University Lecture Series. We have all closely watched his work over the months and years because of his humane intelligence and solid empirical effort. He has admirably fulfilled the task of science which he once described as the making clear through analysis what is opaque in daily life. Of all the socialist geographers doing good work, and there are many, he is the most respected by orthodox geographers, radical geographers, and non-geographers alike. His personal development during the last two decades is representative of the major changes that have occurred in human geography. His detailed study of the Kentish hop industry yielded in the late sixties to a book-length study of geographic methodology which led in turn to increasing dissatisfaction and finally a break with orthodoxy signaled by the publication of his 1973 book on urbanism and social theory. Since then, he has undertaken historical materialist examinations of the urban process under capitalism, and his lecture concerned some of this latest research.

The title of the talk might cause one mistakenly to believe that it would be a synthetic or interpretive essay. Actually, the material presented was only a part of a much larger analytic structure that Harvey has developed over the last five years. Most of this work has been published in article-form, often not in geographical journals. Harvey assured us during the talk that a book was in the making. Harvey argued in the conclusion to his latest book against either atomistic associationism or emergent holism in favor of a relational view in which parts and whole dialectically interpenetrate and define each other. If we are to evaluate his work by his own standards, we need to consider a part of his work such as this talk in relation to other parts so as not to mistake it for a non-relational whole. Obviously, I cannot but begin to do such a job in this review, but it is important to keep the task in mind.

The talk summarized and condensed a recently published article which put forward a theoretical framework for the analysis of the urban process.² This original reformulation of Marx's laws of capital accumulation needs to be considered in conjunction with another of Harvey's articles on class struggle around the built environment in order to give due emphasis to capital accumulation and class struggle, because separation of these aspects even for analytical purposes alone can lead to serious problems.³ He has also written on the broader, regional and international context within which the urban process must be situated.⁴ One can only fully appreciate Harvey's contribution by looking at his other work on class structure and residential differentiation, rent theory, housing and finance capital, and the ideology of planning.⁵

Clad in a purple velour shirt, Harvey lectured to an attentive audience in a large classroom in Science Hall. A Dickensian note was interjected into the scene when someone noticed that he had arrived with bits of grass clinging to the back of his shirt, while someone else commented that he had been seen at Picnic Point prior to the talk. After being introduced, he carefully removed a timepiece from his wrist, placed it on the desk in front of him, and began slowly but forcefully to unravel the complicated skein of his arguments. Lecturing from the top of his head without reference to notes, he paced deliberately back and forth on the stage as if he were pressing his thoughts into the hardwood floor. Apologizing for what he said appeared to be a structural-functionalist diagram, he elaborated an ingenious model of the circuits of capital based on a close reading of Marx's Capital. The idea seems to have developed from Lefebvre's discussion of the two circuits of the circulation of surplus value. Harvey delegated urban problems and forms per se to a secondary position. A reading of Harvey's overall work reveals that he consistently refuses to consider urban morphology to be as important as urban processes, and moreover that he denies any peculiarly urban processes as opposed to more general social processes.

The primary circuit of capital involves the most fundamental relation of the capitalist mode of production in which labor produces useful objects for capital to exchange on the market, and in return is paid a wage which in turn can purchase use values for consumption. Only living labor can produce value and surplus value, the latter being the part of value over and above what is needed for the maintenance and reproduction of labor power. The drive to accumulate surplus value by the adoption of more productive technologies is the internal dynamic of the system. Harvey presented two different versions of this basic production-consumption loop, each with slightly different simplifying assumptions (one based on "the general law of accumulation"-- Vol. I of Capital; the other based on "reproduction on an expanded scale"-- Vol. II of Capital), but both have an inherent tendency for overaccumulation, too much capital is produced relative to the opportunities to employ it due to the essentially anarchic condition of production at an aggregated level. These crises of overaccumulation are manifested as 1) gluts in commodities 2) surplus money and a falling rate of interest 3) idle productive capacity 4) idle labor (unemployment) and 5) a falling rate of profit.

If we relax the assumption about production and consumption occurring in one period of time which these analyses presume, a temporary solution to an overaccumulation crisis is the switching of capital flows into a secondary circuit of capital where fixed capital and consumption fund items are formed. Fixed capital includes aids to production (producer durables) and a physical framework for production (built environment for production), while, in a parallel way, the consumption fund includes aids to consumption (consumer durables) and a physical framework for consumption (built environment for consumption). This switching is not easy and, in fact, the tendency for overaccumulation in the primary circuit and underinvestment in the secondary circuit represents a fundamental contradiction of the system. Financial and state institutions act as a kind of collective nerve center in mediating the complicated switching process between these two circuits of capital.

A tertiary circuit of capital comes into play primarily as a result of state intervention of two major types: 1) investment in science and technology required for the continuous revolutionizing of the forces of production 2) social expenditures for education and health to improve the quality of labor power but also for police, the armed services, and ideology to repress and coopt labor. It is in this third circuit that class struggle as crystallized in the state is especially crucial. Harvey calls for theoretical and historical elaboration of the role of the state in directing capital flows into this tertiary circuit, but he does not provide this himself, and it is doubtful if it could be done within his basically simple circuit model.

Harvey emphasized the importance of the fixity of the built environment and the necessary contradictions posed by this fact. (He acknowledged that this fixity is relative, but also insisted that in a very real way we can assume that Manhattan cannot be moved around or transported elsewhere.) This approach contrasted with urbanists who would emphasize the role of collective consumption (Castells, Lojkine), the function of space-creating property (Lamarche), or the process of distribution and redistribution of resources in an urban territorial structure (Paul). The urban environment as a built environment is a place where man-made created space comes to dominate traditional effective space which involved differentiation and articulation along ecological lines. The city is a place that Marx might characterize as having a high organic composition of capital. The built environment is durable; difficult to alter; fixed; absorbent of large, lumpy investments; and a complex, composite commodity. Many of these features have been traditionally cited as distinctive qualities of land in general. Harvey considers the city to be super-organic land with the crucial difference that urban land is man-made and not a gift of nature. (Interestingly, Harvey accentuated the importance of high fixed capital inputs in hop growing in his early studies.) The fixity and durability create a fundamental contradiction of the system. On the one hand, the built environment enhances labor productivity, or decreases the costs and turnover time of circulation, but, on the other hand, capital finds its continued growth physically constrained as new types of more efficient capital develop. Thus, massive devaluations of the exchange value of the built environment are the "irrational rationalizers" required by the internal logic of a

system if the conditions for its continuation are to be created. The antagonism between socially-generated use values and privately-appropriated exchange values in that most human of environments, the modern city, produces tendencies towards social and economic crisis. Harvey did not accent the revolutionary potential of such crises in his talk, but he did link together various facets and types of contradictions so as to make it unmistakable that he thought capitalism had a large enough number of specific, concrete problems that its ultimate demise was likely.

I had the feeling after hearing Harvey's talk that modern society is a tragic play with capitalism the noble (progressive) but fatally flawed (contradictory) hero. By pointing out the pathos and drama of his presentation, I do not intend to belittle it. Quite the opposite, I extend my warm, enthusiastic support. Harvey's fondness for Dickens is well known, and this liking of his stems as much from the substance as from the sentiment of Dickens' writing. Marx and his children recited Shakespeare aloud on Sunday outings. In the preface to the first German edition of the first volume of Capital, Marx suggested the generality of his analysis with the phrase De te fabula narratur: "It is of you that the story is told." Shall we look forward to the climax and denouement of the action?

Footnotes

1. David Harvey, "Locational Change in the Kentish Hop Industry and the Analysis of Land Use Patterns," Institute of British Geographers Transactions 33(1963): 123-144; idem, Explanation in Geography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); idem, Social Justice and the City (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1973).
2. _____, "The Urban Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 1978(2): 101-131.
3. _____, "Labor, Capital, and Class Struggle Around the Built Environment in Advanced Capitalist Societies," Politics and Society 6(1976): 265-295.
4. _____, "The Geography of Capitalist Accumulation: A Reconstruction of the Marxian Theory," Antipode 7(1975): 9-21.
5. _____, "Class Structure in a Capitalist Society and the Theory of Residential Differentiation," pp. 354-369 in Ronald Peel; Michael Chisholm; and Peter Haggett, Processes in Physical and Human Geography: Bristol Essays (Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd, 1975); idem, "Class-Monopoly Rent, Finance Capital and the Urban Revolution," Regional Studies 8(1974): 239-255; idem, "On Planning the Ideology of Planning," pp. 213-233 in R.W. Burchell and G. Sternlieb, eds., Planning Theory in the 1980s (New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1978).

* * *

Henry Ford might not have appreciated history, but he certainly had strong praise for geographical field work. When he was asked about the need to provide federal assistance for the homeless children riding the rails during the depression, Ford's 1932 response was "Why, it's the best education in the world for those boys, that travelling around."

(quoted in Regulating the Poor: The Function of Public Welfare
by F.F. Piven and R.A. Cloward)

IMAGINATION AND PHILOSOPHIES OF THE LAND

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

The central point of this talk was to take a practical look at a materialist philosophy of the land. In terms of geography, that involves a critique of Western geographical fantasies and concepts. On the positive side these considerations start towards the development of a notion of the well being of people.

A brief sketch was made of the contrast between Western and American Indian philosophies of the land. Special note was made that such generalizations should not be thought to represent particular Indian peoples; as for too long simplistic abstractions and outside observations have been offered as substitutes for complex living patterns. The contrast in imagination was described in terms of three different perspectives.

1. The ways in which different forms of experience are valued or considered to constitute knowledge.
2. Various definitions and ways of understanding nature.
3. Conceptualizations and attitudes regarding land.

From this foundation examples were discussed which illustrated both the historical and contemporary significance of these differences. The examples and interpretations came from the past three years of working on the streets of Minneapolis. During this time practical experience was gained by working with community based organizations in a working class community and with Little Earth of the United Tribes Inc. (A non-profit housing corporation operated by the American Indian Movement).

In summary, it was stated that the contrast in cultures and philosophies between American Indian peoples and the dominant Western view is alive and well today. Furthermore, if we are to reexamine the practical strategies necessary to provide for the well being of a people we must be careful to acknowledge the importance of imagination and the native philosophical attitudes towards the land.



Mike Peters for The Dayton Daily News

NATIONALISM AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT:
SCOTLAND AND THE MODEL OF INTERNAL COLONIALISM

Mark Bouman
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Tossing faction will o'erwhelm
Our crazy double-bottomed realm.

So said Swift 250 years ago when commenting "On The Union" of Scotland and England, and so it seems today, as Westminster has tried to stave off being "o'erwhelmed" by regional factions by trying a variety of measures, ranging from strong regional economic policies to political devolution. Certainly some of these measures are introduced in the genuine hope of promoting national efficiency or even regional equity, and may seem to some to be overly beneficent (particularly to the present Government). But in spite of a strong awareness of a "problem" and attempts to alleviate it, factions continue to "toss" on the Celtic fringes of the British Isles; some, because they are romantically inclined toward a pre-industrial Celtic past, others because they feel that the region is being dished uneven slices of the government pie, yet others because they happen to labor in a lagging industrial sector which is concentrated in that region, and so on into a widening gyre of complexity. Indeed, if there is but one source of agreement in Scotland, it may well be that the realm is "crazy" and that its "double-bottom" lists rather heavily in the direction of Westminster. (However, even this can be qualified by noting the range of reactions to the "craziness", from acceptance of the status quo to radical separation.)

How, then, can all of this be understood without being buried in an avalanche of complexity? The understanding of nationalist agitation on the Celtic fringe, specifically in Scotland, can be addressed from a number of perspectives, since apparently, there a number of reasons for nationalist agitation. It might be a good idea, then, to get at the roots of the problem by discussing the nature of the Union itself, a "given" to which the various groups, classes, parties, factions, etc. react according to their differing perspectives of the situation. One way to organize such a discussion of the Union that would account for many of these varying perspectives is to use the model of internal colonialism.(1) While it has clear shortcomings in some respects (for example, difficulty of empirical verification; a tendency to impute conspiracy to every Act of Parliament; an apparent disregard for internal variation within the periphery, or for relationships between Scotland, and, say, Ireland)(2), it nonetheless is helpful in that it presents the Anglo-Scottish relationship as a core-periphery one from political, economic, and cultural perspectives. In addition, it provides a framework for both the discussion of Union and reaction to it, a way in which we may perhaps fruitfully examine both underlying structural characteristics and subjective impressions of the situation. I suggest, then, that we use the model as a heuristic device to arrange discussion of a difficult subject rather than as a catch-all explanation of the Scottish predicament.

Boiled to its essentials, the model presumes an unequal core-periphery relationship with an enclave in the periphery which more or less facilitates and administrates core policies. What is unequal about this relationship? On one level, it may simply be the differential economic development of the core and periphery, occurring as the periphery develops as a complement to the core economy at the expense of its own independent development. Forced to concentrate in certain sectors (eg. shipbuilding, woollens), it is much more open to the vicissitudes of the world economy. Financial institutions tend to be centered in the core (or, to a lesser degree, in the enclave), and labor is provided by workers in the periphery for firms operated from the core.

This "cultural division of labor" raises another aspect of uneven development under the internal colonial situation, and it is what adds extra strength to the use of the term "colonial": the periphery is, and views itself as, culturally distinct from the core, and, significantly, it is a culture which the core tends to try to assimilate to its own way of doing things, if not to overtly dominate it. (Against this backdrop we can see the decline in Gaelic-speakers with the increase in Anglicization. Reactions to this vary from resignation and willingness to assimilate-- on his deathbed Hume asked to be forgiven not for his sins, but for his Scotticisms--to the somewhat strident attempts to fight back, whether that takes the form of preserving Gaelic or reviving Lallans as a literary language.(3)† A sort of "cultural division of labor" exists in the modern context of the multinational firm, where entrepreneurial initiative and profits are to be found elsewhere, and, again, the actual labor takes place in Scotland(4).

On yet another level, the unequal core-periphery relationship manifests itself politically: to what extent do Scots have a voice in their own affairs? We must consider again the persistence of the memory of an independent Scotland, a memory which is of invaluable assistance to modern day nationalists. But with an established Church and separate legal and educational systems, the question might be: so what else does Scotland want? If the gradual devolution of authority to Scotland as a response to pressure beginning in 1885 with the creation of the Scottish Office is any indication, the answer is, simply, more: more attention from Westminster, more recognition of uniquely Scottish problems, more autonomy.

The latter is an important question especially today, since the methods used by Westminster to deal with an admittedly "distressed" area since the 1930's are heavily economic, and involve the creation of huge administrative apparatuses which may themselves become self-perpetuating.(5) What are the effects of regional economic policies on the area? Who decides such policy? How much support is released to a given region? How much input do Scots have in deciding these matters? These questions show the importance of political power, for it may be that the most important questions concerning a region's economy are settled 300 miles away from it, or, as we have seen with the increasing location of multinational firms in Scotland due to favorable regional inducements, even farther.

In general, then, the periphery is set apart from the core by its lack of control over its independent destiny. Core policies are instrumental and ad hoc, whether this means pursuing an active regional policy only when the national economy is growing or courting disaffected voters with certain promises of aid or devolution, promises which may be rescinded or modified (witness the referendum tacked on to the Scotland and Wales Act in March, 1979).

What prompts these ad hoc responses are pressures from interest groups; the government, in yielding to pressure, does so to avoid a crisis situation.(6) Certain policies yield certain responses, which in turn affect the way in which future policies are made. Depending on our perspective, then, we have a tradition of government often rather proudly "muddling through", or we have a slowly responsive, cynically calculating bureaucratic mess.

It might be useful to sum up the argument here with a diagram illustrating some of the ways in which the Anglo-Scottish relationship is seen through varying perspectives. In crude form Fig. 1 depicts a core (embodied here by the UK government), and a periphery, which is broken down into an enclave (E) and hinterland (H). The government sets policies which are either explicitly regional or national with regional side effects. The effects of the policies are perceived differently by differing groups, which lead to differing responses, ranging on a continuum from the nationalist, extra-systemic response from the hinterland to the more traditional, assimilationist type from the enclave. These responses, in turn, feedback to affect future policy.




Figure 1

To take an example, if we accept the proposition that "Scottish national consciousness has long been strong enough to have powerful political effects when not checked by stronger opposing forces,"(7) we can see how strong some opposing forces must have been in holding down the perception of the Union as a bad thing. For example, there is the success of Anglo-Scottish Imperial hegemony as a positively perceived effect by the members of the industrialist enclave and represented in the one-time strength of Scottish Conservatism. There is also the attraction of the Labour Party as a vehicle of radicalism among the working-classes and disaffected members of the economic and cultural hinterland. But with hegemony on the wane and the Labour Party becoming ever more bureaucratic and

slowly responsive to the needs of the Scottish worker, perceptions change, disillusionment sets in and manifests itself in different ways: as a demand for separation, as a demand for more aid, as a demand for a change of party in power. But at times like this, when buttressed by the economic fact of oil, nationalist sentiment can perhaps unite enclave and hinterland (and, significantly, obscure many cultural and class differences(8)): "No form of political argument is simpler than that which can ascribe a wide range of grievances to one first cause"(9)--that is, to an unsatisfactory Union. The government, of course, responds by offering greater measures of devolution in order to stave off complete schism. What will it do with oil?

The advantage of this model is that it is a sort of mirror to which events can be held up for critical examination. A danger, of course, is in over-simplification and in replacement of the model as tool by the model as an ideology (10); nevertheless, the introduction of historical and cultural awareness to an economic problem in such a way can surely help in understanding why factions "toss".

NOTES

- (1) The most well-known study is Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe In British National Development, 1536-1966, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1975. See also S.W. Williams, "Internal Colonialism, Core-Periphery Contacts and Devolution: An Integrative Comment," Area, Vol.9, No. 4, 1977, pp.272-278.
- (2) John A. Agnew, "The Rise of Political Regionalism In The British Isles: Is Ethnic Mobilization an Adequate Explanation?," Syracuse University Dept. of Geography Discussion Paper Series, 42, March, 1978; John Lovering, "The Theory of the 'Internal Colony' and the Political Economy of Wales," The Review of Radical Political Economists, Vol. 10(3), Fall, 1978, pp. 55-67; Doreen Massey, "Regionalism: Some Current Issues," Capital and Class, 6, Fall, 1978, 106-125.
- (3) See the preface to The Golden Treasury of Scottish Poetry, ed. Hugh Macdiarmid, London, MacMillan, 1941; The Scottish Literary Journal, Dec., 1978 has a Macdiarmid Memorial Issue.
- (4) J.N. Firn, "External Control and regional development: the case of Scotland," Environment & Planning, 1975(7), 393-414; N. Hood & S. Young, "U.S. Investments in Scotland: Aspects of the Branch Factory Syndrome," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, XXIII, 3, Nov., 1976, pp.276-294.; S. Holland, The Regional Problem, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1976, pp. 34-37 and passim.
- (5) G. Tullock, The Vote Motive, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976.
- (6) J. Habermas, "Problems of Legitimation in Late Capitalism," pp. 363-387, and Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structures", pp. 388-421, both in Paul Connerton, ed., Critical Sociology, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976.
- (7) Iain Mc Lean, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party," Political Studies, XVIII, 3, 1970, pp.357-372, p.359.
- (8) But if some of the demands are met for one group and not for others, differences may re-emerge. See P. Hetherington, "Scots Nats Revert to 'Independence Only'," Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 23, 1979.
- (9) McLean, p.371.
- (10) Lovering, p. 66.

CENTRAL PLACE THEORY AFTER SRAFFA

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There is something almost deceitful about neo-classical economic geographers theorizing in a vocabulary which never has and never will reflect what actually happens in the real world. Central Place Theory has become a perfect example of where theoretical practice has become merely practice in theorizing. It may be good for the mind but it is bad for the soul. But who cares? The circle (or is the hexagon more appropriate?) of the seventh heaven had long been banished before modern interpreters wrote about Central Place Theory.

We must begin at the beginning with what we know and not with what other people tell us we know. It is sufficient to say that both as geographers and human beings we have a general idea of what is going on around us. We see Woolworth's five and ten stores and know that they do not compete fairly with the true nickel and dime store at the corner of our block. We know that although that all men are equal in God's eyes in Man's eyes they are not. What we know as individuals, however, is not what we know when we join and participate in the collective known as Academia. It seems when we become academics personal experience flies out the window and intellectual abstraction comes through the front door. Our techniques become more and more sophisticated while the assumptions which underlie them become more and more absurd.

This has not always been so. Adam Smith's economics is swaddled in actual descriptions of the economy as he knew it. David Ricardo had even more scruples than Smith. As Joan Robinson has said Ricardo was trying to find the assumption which could never be fiddled. He never did find it. The letter he wrote to Malthus just a few days before he died is one of regret; the regret of not discovering the unimpeachable assumption (Sraffa 1952, Vol. 9, pp 380-82). Instead Ricardo's cause had to wait a hundred years before it was taken up again; this time by an Italian economist at Cambridge, England, named Piero Sraffa.

Sraffa in a slim volume entitled "Production of Commodities By the Means of Commodities" (1960) discovered an absolute standard of value which was invariable to changes in the distribution of income. This had been Ricardo's quest. Ricardo had been flummoxed by a problem which arose when he tried to calculate the share of national income going to each of the three major social classes i.e. workers, capitalists, and landlords. As the share of national income changes between profits and wages (land rent is omitted because it does not effect price levels) so does the value of the national income which is to be distributed. This circularity means that it is very difficult to know if a social class has benefited from changes in income distribution. It was Sraffa's genius to find a way out of this dilemma by constructing a measuring rod of national income which is invariable to movements in the proportion of national income which each class receives.

Sraffa's solution is derived from a set of simultaneous equations which represent the technical conditions of production for any economy. Commodities enter into the production of other commodities. Given the technical coefficients of production and either the share of wages or the share of profits in national income it is possible to calculate all commodity prices and also the wage or profit rate, depending upon which is given a priori.

The major contribution of Sraffa's work is to show that social conflict is an inherent part of the economic system. The question boils down to what forces determine the exogenously given variable in Sraffa's series of equations? If, as many commentators argue, the wage rate is given then, as Dobb (1973, p261) puts it, "the boundaries of economics as a subject are ipso facto drawn differently and more widely: they are drawn so as to include social, and moreover institutionally and historically relative changing and changeable conditions that are excluded from economics as viewed in the post-Jevonian tradition."

Sraffa's analysis, and the neo-Ricardian school which it has spawned, have had two major effects. First, they have offered a solution to the "transformation problem" (though Marxists are still wrangling over its appropriateness); and secondly, the wind but not the stuffing has been knocked out of the orthodox theory of production and distribution (this has become known as the "Capital Debate").

To get back to the original theme, we left Adam Smith bogged down in a morass of facts and David Ricardo trapped in his own sincerity. The neo-classical economists who followed them offered no assistance. So as not to get ensnared themselves they avoided both the facts and their own consciences. They instead flew effortlessly into the realms of abstraction where nothing could hurt them, especially reality.

It is strange but a similar thing happened in geography. Walter Christaller wrote 'Central Places in Southern Germany' in 1933. Christaller, though he was confused about the issue (Christaller 1966, pp5-6), had the classical and not the neo-classical economists' instinct for choosing realistic assumptions. Not only did he tell you what those assumptions were but why he chose them. Since then his work has been corrupted. It is obvious Losch contributed to this but it is unclear just how deliberate a process that was. Losch read Christaller but it is doubtful that he filched any ideas from him. Rather the out and out neo-classical nature of Losch's theorizing (i.e. the assumptions of perfect competition, homo-economicus, private ownership of firms, equilibrium) and the similarity in form between Losch and Christaller meant that Christaller's realism was lost in the scurry of activity to test and reformulate Central Place theory in the 1950's. The interpreters of Central Place Theory are to blame not its creators. The distinctions between Losch and Christaller were never made and the sensibleness of Christaller's version was consequently lost.

To bring back some of Christaller's realism it is proposed to integrate the Central Place Theory of Christaller with the economics of Sraffa.

There are a number of formal and logical relationships between the two theories. Christaller uses the idea of surplus of importance and this emerges in terms of.... "A city's... command over its hinterland" (Barton 1978, p34). This in turn determines centrality which can be obtained empirically by calculating the number of goods and services a place provided in excess of the needs of its own residents (Preston 1971a, 1971b, and 1975). This is very closely affiliated to the surplus that Sraffa discusses in the opening pages of his book. For Sraffa surplus is the excess number of commodities that remain once the cycle of production has been completed and all inputs have been replaced. Thus, whereas for Sraffa the surplus determines the level of wages and profits in an economy, for Christaller it determines the level of prosperity between cities.

Another link between the two theories is that since Christaller's theory is based on the range of a good (unlike Losch who employs 'threshold' profits can be positive and vary over time. Sraffa also suggests that profits will be positive (providing the wage bill is not equal to all the surplus) and flexible. The exact level of profits in Sraffa's system depends upon the power of workers in fixing the wage rate.

If there are these similarities between Sraffa and Christaller what are the consequences of combining the two theories? As will be demonstrated below, using the set of equations developed by Sraffa, Central Place Theory reveals very different results from that usually obtained.

Let there be three sizes of cities (MCT) organized in a hierarchical hexagonal pattern. Let there also be three commodities, X, Y, and Z. Each good has a different range. X has a greater range than Y and Z; and Y has a greater range than Z (XYZ). Also suppose each commodity is used in the production of itself and also the other two commodities.

$$X=f(X,Y,Z)$$

$$Y=f(Y,X,Z)$$

$$Z=f(Z,X,Y)$$

Commodity X is only produced in city M because of its large range, City M also produces Y and Z. City C produces commodities Y and Z; whereas city T only manufactures Z. Because the production of Y requires X as an input, city C has to purchase X from M. The price of X will be dearer at C than M because of transport costs. This in turn will cause the price of Y to be higher at C than M. Differential prices for Y will result in M expanding its market for that commodity. A similar process occurs with the production of Z. City T to produce Z must purchase commodity X from M, and commodity Y from either M or C. City C if it is also to produce Z must similarly purchase X from M. Once again M will have the lowest prices for Z followed by C, and then finally city T will sell Z for the highest price. These price differences will manifest themselves in terms of different sized markets and hence sizes of surpluses which accrue to each city.

So far the question of city growth has only been examined statically. The model becomes far more interesting and realistic when time is introduced. One scenario is that the expansion of M's market would lead to the growth of output, higher profits and hence greater investment. This would precipitate economies of scale (including technological advances) which again would reduce costs further and cause an even greater expansion of M's markets. Once again "to him who hath shall be given." One can envisage other developments. For example, the rise of monopolies in M who then later spread to other regions. Whatever the specific details of the plot, M's initial advantage always tends to make it top dog in the end.

Those who can, follow, and those who can't become innovators. The followers have their noses so far down on the ground that they never look where they're going. Those for whom the scent becomes too sickly begin their own trail. Why people should find the existing scent too nauseating is not an easy question to answer. There are countless books, which go under the generic title of the sociology of knowledge, which try to address this problem. But in one sense they are doomed to failure because they are attempting to provide a list of rules which define a genius. Christaller was a genius and began his own trail. Yet the people who followed him found the scent of the trail that they had been previously following too seductive. So instead of going the whole way with Christaller they branched off and returned to the main path. This has been the route that most people have followed since then. Sraffa, on the other hand, was really only half a genius because he only rediscovered a path that had become disused. This paper has tried to show that Christaller's and Sraffa's trails if not converge at least run parallel to one another.

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CONSUMPTION OF THE SPECTACLE:
TRAVEL FOR LUXURY, TRAVEL OUT OF NECESSITY

Kent Mathewson
University of Wisconsin

I would like to open this discussion with a passage from Elisee Reclus' Revolution and Evolution. Reclus, for those who are not familiar with his work, was perhaps the most prominent French anarchist and geographer of the 19th century.¹ Author of massive regional geographies written for popular consumption, Reclus from the revolutions of 1848 until his death in 1905 was a tireless propagandist for the international anarchist cause. Friend, colleague, and comrade of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and other revolutionary figures of that era, Reclus effectively fused his political ideals with his geographical scholarship. Pedagogue to a worldwide audience, Elisee Reclus held only one university appointment, that late in life, and at the alternative Free University of Brussels. Reclus' internationalism and work outside of the French university system have obscured his role as the founder of modern French geography. That distinction falls more narrowly on Paul Vidal de la Blache.² However, much of what Reclus wrote has a currency that has sparked a revival of interest in both his geographical and political writings.³

His critique of tourism illustrates this currency. In discussing education, Reclus remarked:⁴

If instruction were only to be obtained at school, governments might still hope to hold the minds of men enslaved; but it is outside the school that most knowledge is gained. It is picked up in the street, in the workshops. . . by gazing at new landscapes, by visiting foreign towns. Almost every one travels now, either as a luxury or a necessity. The rich travel more than the poor, it is true; but they generally travel aimlessly; when they change countries they do not change surroundings, they are always in a sense at home; the luxuries and enjoyments of hotel life do not permit them to appreciate the essential differences between country and country, people and people. The poor man, who comes into collision with the difficulties of life without guide or cicerone, is best qualified to observe and remember. . .

Reclus has touched on the dichotomy which I will examine briefly in this paper, namely that travel is undertaken either for luxury or for necessity. In 1974 I traveled to highland Guatemala, in part out of necessity, but also for luxury, to study intensive horticulture in the Lake Atitlan basin.⁵ There, precisely two decades after the Dulles Brothers orchestrated the overthrow of the progressive nationalist Arbenz regime, I found a landscape of nascent tourist boom, superimposed on an economy of small-holder intensive vegetable production and forced labor migrations. Two decades before the Arbenz regime fell, that literary tourist, Aldous Huxley found Panajachel to be "a squalid, uninteresting place, with a large low-class Mestizo population and an abundance of dram shops." Huxley considered the lake, on the other hand to be "touching the limits of the permissibly picturesque. . . it is really too much of a good thing."⁶ Had Huxley bothered to venture beyond the main street and examine the Indian's raised garden plots, even his rose-tinted, strained Victorian sensibilities might have been forced to acknowledge a landscape of indigenous production that was anything but squalid and uninteresting. Though perhaps not. Huxley may have been too far removed from the sources of his own family's wealth to appreciate the attractiveness of a large, easily exploited labor force pre-adapted to seasonal mobility. The German, Scandinavian, and English coffee planters who reached the Atitlan Basin in the later 19th century well appreciated both the spectacular landscape and the opportunities for manipulating the local labor pool.

Four hundred years earlier, the invading Spaniards enjoyed the same qualities. The history, then, of the Lake Atitlan basin can be seen as one of interplay between autochthonous peoples with strong bonds to land, place, and community resisting a succession of state-level authorities who would have them periodically travel by necessity to work

on lowland plantations.

One of the problems confronting Marxist historical geographers is the question of to what degree were different pre-capitalist states and empires pre-adapted to facilitate the imposition of the capitalist mode of production? In the case of highland Guatemala, the Spanish inherited an already well articulated system of trade and corvee labor involving highland/lowland exchanges. In part, the basis of this system was the cacao industry--with cacao beans functioning as specie for much of the trade in Mesoamerica. The legacy of this system may still be seen in the movement of seasonal labor throughout the region. However, in this discussion, I am not directly concerned with the question of the residual longevity of pre-capitalist modes of production vs. their extirpation by capitalism. I will turn instead to what might be lightly called a problem in the "mode of consumption". For this, I borrow from the writings of the French Situationists, indirect heirs to Reclus' critique of the use of place and space in everyday life. Whether seen as shock troops seeking the Dictatorship of the Imagination, or perhaps as meta-Marxists, the otherwise excessive Situationist project finds its metier in the critique of tourism. Where else is the Society of the Spectacle--daily life mediated by images--more clearly apparent than in the realm of travel for luxury's sake? And where else can one see so easily the raw mechanics of economic imperialism counterpointed by the fetishism of landscape relief features and peoples rendered as spectacles and consumed as commodities, than in the tourist landscapes of the Third World?

Accordingly, I offer a series of theses on tourism with which to view travel both as luxury and as a necessity.

I. Tourism as a subject of geographical study:

1. Subdisciplines such as recreational geography, the geography of tourism, and the geography of sports are seen as lacking the seriousness of such "front-line" paradigm-building subfields as geographic methodology and the philosophy of science; spatial analysis; cultural ecology; urban geography; biophysical geography, etc.
2. As practiced, the geography of tourism and allied subjects find greatest acceptance at the lower stations in the professional hierarchy. Pariah subfields at some departments are staples at others. This can be expected in a society where divisions of labor are evident in all institutions.
3. Tourism viewed as a commodity allows critical geographers to study tourism in the Third World as a process intimately linked to both the accumulation of capital by the Metropolitan core centers, and as an agent for the propagation of Spectacular consciousness.

II. Tourism and Imperialism:

1. The origins of modern tourism are rooted in the period 1870-1915, or coeval with the emergence of Monopoly Capitalism.
2. The preconditions for modern tourism were formed during earlier phases of capitalism. Among other phenomena, the antecedents can be seen in:
 - 1) Grand Tours, which functioned as haute bourgeois rites of passage and allowed transnational contact between members of the emerging international ruling class.
 - 2) Upper class transhumance for reasons of health and socializing: retreats to spas, etc.
 - 3) Natural history expeditions financed by patrons, or sometimes self-financed.

Exotic places become publicized; travel to them becomes an object of desire realized almost exclusively in day dreams rather than in fact.

3. After about 1920 tourism emerges as an organized industry.

- 1) The cruise ship phenomenon emerges from the need to transport commodities like bananas, etc., from the Third World. The dual function of the United Fruit's White Star Line is case in point.
- 2) The State becomes involved in the tourist industry by setting aside land as National Parks, Yellowstone being the first soon after the Civil War.
- 3) The earlier health-oriented vacations become conjoined with flight from industrial centers. Suburbs emerge as permanent vacation landscapes, with country clubs, golf courses, swimming pools, etc., close at hand.
- 4) Growth of the resort hotel industry is made possible by improved transport. Miami Beach becomes the prefiguration of Caribbean development several decades later.
- 5) Multinationals become involved in hotel business after WWII. Havana emerged as the hemispheric CVD (central vice district: hotels, casinos, organized crime, plus a willing local government). The Cuban Revolution forces dispersion. Las Vegas and the Bahamas replace Havana (financed by H. Hughes' organization, D. Ludwig, etc.)

III. Tourism and the Ideology of Spectacular Society:

1. Tourism is an officially promoted microcosm of the ideological prejudices of bureaucratic, bourgeois society.
2. Tourism promotes the myth of transcending one's limitations through horizontal mobility; i.e., freedom as defined as mobility.
3. Tourism promotes the cult of the exotic place by providing a transitory negation of one's own arena of daily activity.
4. Vacations, taken as flights back to nature, or trips back in time, are illusory attempts to experience landscapes where simpler (i.e., pre-capitalist) modes of production prevail.
5. Tourism encourages a reified view of the world. Space and time become obstacles to be overcome as efficiently as possible. From home to hotel and back. From point A to B to C. As a frenzied race against the clock, vacations become forced marches in which the consumption of spectacles is policed by an army of hotel employees, guides, and attendants.
6. Tourism often functions as a narcissistic reinforcement of feelings of cultural superiority.

IV. Tourism as Spectacle, as Commodity:

1. A by-product of the circulation of commodities, tourism, human circulation considered as consumption, is basically reduced to the leisure of going to see what has become banal. The economic organization of the frequentation of different places is already in itself the guarantee of their equivalence. The same modernization which has removed time from travel has also removed from it the reality of space.

Guatemala's climate of extreme political terror and instability is rarely if ever mentioned in the tourist information. One might contrast this with the case of Jamaica where there has been an apparent campaign to "destabilize" that country's democratic socialist government through negative publicity aimed at potential tourists concerning Jamaica's climate of "political instability". The tourist industry in Guatemala is booming, while Jamaica's economy is besieged.

What effect does the tourist boom have on peasant livelihood patterns in an area like the Lake Atitlan basin? In Panajachel, the tourist boom has created serious inflation in land prices.⁸ By 1974 land near the lake was being sold for as much as \$20,000 per acre. Although few if any farmers own as much as an acre, the temptation is great to sell their micro-parcels for the equivalent of many years' earnings. If they do sell, and if they intend to continue farming, they must seek marginal lands near the river that are subject to periodic floods. Therefore, their livelihood is precarious. The alternative is to find employment in the tourist trade. This may mean major changes in life style. Or, they can seek work in the coastal plantations, with its accompanying proletarianization and travel for necessity. This is understandably the last choice.

Another impact of tourism on the local economies is illustrated by the decline of the fishing specialization in one village, Santa Catarina. For at least the last century this village held a monopoly by expertise on the fishing industry in the lake. In the 1950s tourist impresarios introduced bass from California. The lake's indigenous fishery, consisting of small but abundant local species was decimated.⁹ In turn, the bass grew to sizes that resisted local techniques. Only with the introduction of spear guns and skin-diving equipment brought by the "other" tourists, the backpackers and vagabonds, have the Indians begun to reestablish their fishing industry. However, it has not been the Catarinecos as a village economy that has profited, rather it is a few of the Indian youth of Panajachel that have profited. These youth have been more exposed to change and willing to try new livelihood patterns. In turn, Catarinecos are being forced to travel in even greater numbers to the coast for work, or to come to Panajachel and beg for handouts from the tourists.

These are but two vignettes. Many more could be offered. The immediate prospect is that greater numbers of subsistence farmers, fisherfolk and craftsmen and women will be pushed into the ranks of the proletariat, either serving large-scale agriculture or tourism. Increasingly, their future travels will be taken out of a necessity that will educate them as to the nature of a world in which so many strangers travel for luxury.

Footnotes

1. The biography of Reclus in English that will be the standard for the imaginable future is G.S. Dunbar's Elisee Reclus: Historian of Nature (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1978).
2. While acknowledging Reclus' role as a precursor, A. Buttimer in her Society and Milieu in the French Geographical Tradition (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971) relegates her discussion to footnotes.
3. M. Mikesell may have anticipated this interest in his "Observations on the Writings of Elisee Reclus", Geography 44 (1959): 221-26. D.R. Stoddard's "Kropotkin, Reclus, and 'Relevant' Geography", Area 7 (1975): 188-90 is an explicit example. For the most recent discussions see the special anarchist issue of Antipode 10 (1978).
4. Elisee Reclus, Evolution and Revolution (London: W. Reeves), 9-10.
5. K. Mathewson, Specialized Horticulture in Highland Guatemala: The Tablon System of Panajachel, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin.
6. A. Huxley, Beyond the Mexique Bay (New York: Harper and Bros., 1934).

7. See particularly G. Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red Press, 1977).
8. See R. Hinshaw, Panaajachel, A Guatemalan Town in Thirty-Year Perspective (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).

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USG MEETINGS - VANCOUVER, MAY 1979

Vancouver's 65 inches of annual rainfall remain a mystery to 30 or so members of the U.S.G. who came to the Britania center in east Vancouver for the U.S.G. meetings in May. The sun shone spectacularly throughout: since then, much cloud and rain...

On Saturday and Sunday mornings, various discussions were set up in a manner intended to encourage the breaking down of some traditional divisions. On Saturday, two groups formed around the themes of "space and class in contemporary capitalism" and "historical social formations". On Sunday, the basic division switched from time periods to scale: discussions centered on "the state and uneven development at the local level" and on "international and regional uneven development".

The success of these relatively informal discussions varied. Given the greatly increased familiarity with one another which the Saturday sessions (and party) allowed, the Sunday discussions flowered into very rewarding exchanges. In the "local" session, the relation between the politics of workplace and the politics of community emerged as the theme; the other session focussed on the contentious mode of production/relations of production/ "articulation" issue, with various participants drawing on their own experience/field.

The U.S.G. has opportunities for developing formats for theoretical and other discussions which dig somewhat deeper than the formal paper/brief questions structure of the AAG, CAG, IBG(etc.) sessions, and it seems imperative that this potential be developed. The Vancouver experiments were not entirely successful. We learned that a somewhat greater degree of preparation was still necessary at least in early sessions of a meeting. We faced the difficulties of unilingualism in multilingual contexts-- better prepared than previously, but not yet coherently resolved. Hopefully, future USG meetings will continue the process of discovering and exploring themes and questions of common concern to participants.

* * *

Escherichia coli is a bacteria normally found in human feces. A lab in the U.S. has discovered a way to mutate this bacteria, thereby producing at very low cost several chemical substances that were previously very expensive. Therefore, human bowels are no longer considered totally useless. (Previously they were used only as fertilizer by some poor peasants.) It is now just a matter of time before we see if this old saying comes true: "The day shit becomes gold, poor people will be born without rectums."

Taken from Cambio 16, a Spanish Weekly Serial (June 25, 1978)

Education is a wise and liberal form of police by which property and life and peace of society are secured.

Daniel Webster

USG ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, MAY 25, 1979

The Annual General Meeting in Vancouver was attended by about 35 people, mostly of Canadian residence, with two U.S. and one British participants. Susan Barry was acclaimed as chairperson, and she started the meeting with brief introductory background remarks.

1. FINANCES

Nathan reported on the U.S.G. financial situation.

STATEMENT

(See page 64)

Nathan moved that up to \$75 be set aside for pre-meeting or other emergency mailings, 1979-1980. This was unanimously agreed upon. After some discussion of costs and income, particularly with reference to rising newsletter costs, it was agreed that dues should be raised for the 1979-1980 year to \$6; fully employed members to \$12; individual newsletter subscriptions, \$6; institutional subscriptions, \$12. REMINDER: Dues are payable in May!!! The 20% rise in dues was justified by comparison with 100% and greater rises in costs of newsletter production since dues were set in 1975. The meeting agreed unanimously to the increase.

2. NEWSLETTER

Bob Galois, newsletter co-ordinator, reported on the increasing costs of production. The Australian-edited edition (Vol. 4, No. 4) was to be the last produced at S.F.U., where the capacity to produce the newsletter had all but vanished. Eric Sheppard and Bryan Higgins on behalf of the Minnesota local, and John Bradbury on behalf of the McGill local, both offered to take on printing and distribution. It was decided that the Minnesota local would undertake co-ordination, final editing, printing and distribution of the newsletter for the next year (Vol. 5). Some discussion about newsletter content ensued, in which it was variously commented that

- Abstracts of papers were almost useless; short articles would be better.
- More book reviews and bibliographic material should be included.
- Non-academic, "practical" content was wanted.

The following production schedule for volume 5 was agreed to:

ISSUE	DEADLINE	EDITORS	PUBLICATION DATE
1	Aug. 15 '79	Mark Garner U. of Wisconsin-Madison	Sep. 15 '79
2	Sep. 1 '79	Jo Foord 26 Teesdale Road Leytonstone LONDON E11 1NQ/England	Oct. 15 '79

ISSUE	DEADLINE	EDITORS	PUBLICATION DATE
3	Dec. 15 '79	John Holmes Dep't of Geography Queens University Kingston, Ontario Canada	Jan. 15 '80
4	Mar. 1 '80	? not yet arranged-- volunteers contact Eric Sheppard, Newsletter coordinator	Apr. 1 '80

3. REGIONAL/LOCAL REPORTS

(a) Mickey Lauria reported on the Midwest and Minnesota. A new local exists in Madison, Wisconsin, where the last regional meeting was held (see this issue). The next regional meeting will be at Chicago in the Fall, organized by Jim Blaut and Dick Hansis.

(b) John Bradbury reported that the Quebec regional meeting in November 1978 was attended by 90 people. An attempt to co-ordinate a local state reading/contact group was being made by Sue Ruddock- contact at McGill.

(c) At Queens (Kingston), Fran Klodawsky reported, U.S.G. members were involved in a socialist group which included others and did not see themselves as a local. However, various reading groups had been conducted.

(d) Damaris Rose reported on the U.S.G. (British Isles) section-- since the U.S.G. meetings at the I.B.G. in January, the major activities had centered around the new London branch, which has several ongoing reading and discussion groups. As in North America, contact between different parts of the country is a problem.

(e) Various events on the West Coast have included the growth of a socialist group in geography and planning at U.C.L.A. There are still some signs of life at Vancouver, especially new glimmerings at U.B.C., and also in Victoria.

(f) Elan Rosenquist made it to the west coast from Toronto and told the meeting about some developments there-- particularly that there was uncertainty as to who would still be around next year.

4. REGIONAL CONTACT PEOPLE

Midwest	Mark Garner	Department of Geography University of Wisconsin Madison WI 53706 (608) 262-8920
Ontario	Elan Rosenquist	30 Sparkhall Ave. Toronto Ont.
West Coast	Dick Walker	Department of Geography University of California Berkeley CA
Quebec	Susan Barry	Department of Geography McGill University Montreal Quebec

East Coast	Chrys Rodrigue	Department of Geography Clark University Worcester MASS
British Isles	(contact Damaris Rose or Jo Foord)	
Australia	(contact Ron Horvath of Sydney U. for communications)	

5. ELECTIONS

Treasurer	Bryan Higgins Department of Geography University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455
Corresponding Secretary	John Bradbury Department of Geography McGill University Montreal Quebec
Conference Organizers	Dick Hansis Neil Smith
Newsletter Co-ordinator	Eric Sheppard address as for Bryan Higgins

6. CONFERENCE LOCATION

Elan read a proposal from Toronto to locate USG AGM's according to a least-total-travel approach. Nathan proposed year-by-year selection. Several members urged caution on such decisions. Michael Eliot Hurst and Eric Sheppard proposed that the 1980 AGM be approved, following the rotating schedule, for Louisville, KY. This motion was passed unanimously.

7. OWEN LATTIMORE

Bill Bunge had proposed some time ago that the USG seek to honor Owen Lattimore. Bob Galois and Eric Sheppard proposed that the USG conference organizers for 1980 be directed to support the organization of a special session at the 1980 AAG to honor Owen Lattimore. The proposal was unanimously approved.

8. TEXTBOOK

Eric reported that he had discussed the issues of individual responsibility for sections of the textbook, and of what "USG sponsorship" might mean with Phil O'Keefe. He encouraged interested members to get in contact with Phil at Clarke and Neil Smith at Johns Hopkins. Several people expressed reservations about the framework apparently adopted, and consequently about USG sponsorship.

9. MONOGRAPH SERIES

Bob Galois remarked that the first no. was to have been Jim Andersen's bibliography on urban political economy, revised, expanded, and updated. It was agreed that the London branch should be asked to proceed with this project, with assistance from international members where appropriate. The monograph would have to be self-financed, but the international would put up money(\$600?) for an initial print run.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC GOODS

Michael Curry
University of Minnesota

The term neoconservative has recently come into use as a sort of rubric under which to group a variety of people who share a presumption, often new-found, that social programs, the Great Society for example, and certainly socialism, haven't worked and really ought not to have in the first place, since they involve an overextension of the function of the state. The neoconservatives fall across a fairly broad spectrum, but I want to concentrate on those who call themselves libertarians. There are three reasons for this concentration. First, they present a relatively united front. Second, a number of them have reached positions of prominence. F. von Hayek recently won the Nobel Prize; Alan Greenspan was prominent in the Nixon administration; William Buckley is a TV star. And Third, they, perhaps more than others, emphasize the enhanced morality of their position.

The libertarians characterize the legitimate function of the state as prevention of coercion of members of the state by others. They present two arguments against the legitimacy of the state to act apart from this minimal or watchman function, although not all libertarians present or even accept both arguments. The first is the argument from utility. Specifically, they argue that when the state intercedes in human actions beyond a minimum the result is increased inefficiency, and so everyone loses. This argument, however, is really an empirical one, and so is subject to refutation in individual instances. For that and no doubt other reasons a second argument is usually offered, one based on individual rights. The advocates of this view argue that individual rights are most important, and so the state can legitimately exist only to insure that those rights are not violated. Insofar as this argument is based on normative presuppositions it is not subject to refutation by empirical evidence. But refutation may take one or two other forms -- outright rejection or demonstration of inconsistency.

Much of the criticism of libertarianism has been merely out-of-hand rejection. Certainly it is tempting to reject the notion that within modern and large-scale capitalist society, the basic economic institutions of which are accepted by libertarians, such a state would be even remotely adequate to the tasks at hand. But such a rejection requires the one doing the criticism to provide an alternative edifice from the bottom up. That sort of alternative isn't necessary if it can be shown that the libertarian system is internally inconsistent or is faulty in fundamental ways. It seems to me that libertarianism is sensitive to that sort of criticism.

To begin with, the legitimacy of any state appears to be problematic. That is, it is difficult to imagine a way in which a person who believed fully in the morality of autonomous personal action could consistently involve himself in a state the decision making methods of which were in practice workable. But even assuming that this were in fact possible, the libertarian state fails to fulfill the basic requirements of the libertarian; that is, it fails to provide or even to allow adequate means for control of externalities, provision of public goods, and preservation of common pool resources.

Typically the libertarian interprets coercion narrowly; only actual physical injury or taking of property is considered to be coercive; the envelope of the individual fits rather tightly around its body. The question then arises, what is to be done about externalities. The libertarian state can deal with strict violations; in other cases it is the responsibility of the individual to sue, to ask an impartial observer to determine whether damage has indeed been done. This sort of mechanism appears to present no problems in instances in which one individual is dealing directly with one other. But how might it work in instances in which one individual is damaging a large number of people, but but damaging each at a level below that at which they might be willing to take the trouble to sue? And an even more difficult problem arises when a number of people engage in acts not singly injurious, but injurious in sum. Is each to be held equally responsible? And what of instances in which the entry of a single firm or industry into an area in effect puts that area over the top in terms of a particular problem?

Assuming that the creation of the nuisance or coercion could be unambiguously attributed to a single source, those damaged are themselves in a difficult position. Given that people act, as the libertarians presume, in their own interests, the assembly of a group of people willing to assume the costs and responsibility of pursuing a suit will be hampered by the existence of free riders; each individual will perceive his best strategy to be to hope that others involve themselves, and therefore will avoid the risks of involvement himself.

It has been suggested that this problem might be obviated by introduction of a series of easements. An individual would, when he purchased a piece of property, at the same time purchase air rights, noise rights, water rights, in effect, easements on all those portions of his property that could be infringed on by others. A homeowner could then negotiate with a potential factory owner for, say, rights to make a certain amount of noise. The problem of the free rider arises here again in terms of negotiating costs. Furthermore, in any instance the most trivial claim could result in the prevention of creation of the most beneficial project; for the state to reject the individual's right would be for it to exceed its legitimate authority. And finally, this notion assumes that all such easements could be defined once and for all. Would people one hundred years ago have sold easements for radiation exposure? If not, how might they be legitimately instituted now?

The same sorts of problems arise in the case of public goods, of those goods the provision of which to one individual will result in the provision to all and of which, traditionally, the costs of exclusion of those who do not wish to pay have been considered to be too high to be tolerated. These goods are particularly prone to the problem of the free rider. Consider the most rudimentary urban amenities -- streets, street cleaning, snow shoveling. How might these be provided in an efficient way? The libertarian could argue that such services could be provided by neighborhood groups, but then the problem of the free rider arises. Or he could argue that private companies could purchase land and build and maintain the streets. But certainly it is difficult to imagine workable mechanisms for assessing costs on those who use them. Economically this is not really feasible. The libertarian takes the prevention of coercion to be the only true public good; but there seems to be other goods so nearly unanimously desired that they also ought to be considered public goods.


A special case of the latter is the common-pool resource. Garrett Hardin, in his well known article "The Tragedy of the Commons," (Science 162:3859, 1968, pp. 1243-1248) has argued that a common pool resource, or a resource to which rights have not been unambiguously assigned, will inevitably be overused in the course of individuals acting in their own interests. He concludes that individual rights must be assigned if such an eventuality is to be avoided. Hardin's agreement with the libertarian extends no further; he holds that the assignment of rights ought to occur not on the basis of some a priori notion of self, but in terms of the best possible outcome.

The typical libertarian counter to Hardin is two-fold. First, it is argued that given a free market, as supplies diminish costs will rise and so demand for resources will fall, resources will not run out, they will be replaced. But given the same economic premises it can be demonstrated that in some cases it may be in the best economic interests of a person to deplete totally a resource and sell it at a price lower than that which it might command as it neared depletion, that the capital so acquired would provide benefits in further investment far exceeding those which might result from using the resource in a steady-state system. To this the libertarian may counter with a second argument. Here the distinction between those resources that are necessary and those that are merely desired is drawn. As far as those that are desired, if people aren't willing to pay for them, too bad, that in itself is evidence that they aren't desired that much. But as far as those that are necessary, the libertarian takes the position

that to deprive people of necessities is to, in effect, coerce them, and that therefore the over-use or destruction or holding form market of such resources is an action legitimately subject to prevention by government. But this argument assumes the existence of a clearly-defined baseline, a clearly-defined distinction between those goods that are necessary and those that are not. The distinction, in reality, hardly appears to be clear, either at a given time or over time. For example, the absence of adequate pre-natal care may result in the birth of a child with brain damage or even in a still-birth; is adequate pre-natal care then necessary for life? The libertarian would hardly think so.

The question of common-pool resources brings into closer focus the inadequacies of the libertarian position. Libertarians share with, for example, Hardin, the belief that rational people act in their own self interest. But it appears that the acceptance of that premise in conjunction with the premise that people have individual rights which are inviolable cannot provide a consistent groundwork for a state; given the premises and given a state either people's rights will be violated or the most rudimentary functions of society will go unfilled.

There appear to be two ways of avoiding the conclusion. First, one might deny that people act in their own self-interest; one might suggest that it is an empirical fact that in some cases people do act in response to the needs of the group, to individual leaders, or to symbols, just to give a few examples. Or one might deny that the rights of the individual ought to be taken to be foremost; one might agree with, for example, Marx's statement that the individual is a mere abstraction. The former case suggest a turn to anarchism, the latter to, perhaps, socialism.



LAND USE CONFLICT IN MINNESOTA:
FARMERS VERSUS THE POWER CORPORATIONS

54

Don Olson
Minneapolis, Minnesota

A world-wide energy war is going on against the people, with industry and government in collusion. The oil crisis of 1973 led to spectacular increases in the profits of oil companies. The proliferation of unsafe technology, particularly nuclear power, has spawned widespread opposition. Opposition is most advanced in Europe where the centralization of energy and the development of the breeder reactor program is most advanced. Last summer there were demonstrations of 80,000 at Kalkar, Germany; 50,000 at Malville; and 200,000 at Bilbao, Spain. Recently, 30,000 marched in Australia to protest the uranium mining there. In Europe, they use the slogan "Nuclear Power Means Police Power". One demonstrator was killed by the police at Malville, but the repression has been most intense in Germany, as there has been a resurgence of authoritarianism there.

In the United States, 1,414 people were arrested at the Seabrook nuclear site. Another occupation has been scheduled for June 24 of this year. Inspired by the Seabrook effort, activists have organized as many as a dozen regional anti-nuclear federations. Locally, the Northern Thunder group working within the Northern Sun Alliance scored a recent success when it threw a roadblock in front of the proposed Tyrone nuclear plant in Wisconsin.

Another technology which has spawned opposition has been that of high voltage transmission lines. In upstate New York, a 765 kilovolt AC line is being fought, and plans for any future 765 lines have been dropped because of the opposition. A 500 KV AC additional line to the Bonneville Power Project in the state of Washington has federal marshalls armed with automatic weapons guarding the construction. I have received a letter from a lawyer in Texas representing a group fighting a powerline there.

Farmers are fighting a 800 kilovolt DC line (often called a \pm 400 kilovolt direct current line) here in Minnesota. It is being built by two power cooperatives, Cooperative Power Association (CPA) and United Power Association (UPA). The line starts from a generating plant in Underwood, North Dakota which uses lignite coal from a near-by strip mining operation. The electricity is generated as alternating current (AC), and it is then converted to direct current (DC) for a 427 mile trip to Delano, Minnesota. There it is converted back to alternating current and distributed on two 345 KV AC lines that feed into two Northern States Power (NSP) sub-stations at Mankato and Coon Rapids, where CPA-UPA have facilities. CPA and UPA are what are known as generation and distribution companies. They sell wholesale electricity to their respective 19 and 15 member local Rural Electrification Coops which distribute the electricity at retail rates. CPA and UPA are both incorporated as non-profit organizations. CPA was created in 1956 and UPA in 1971, although their parent organizations date back respectively to 1953 and the late 1930s.

The Rural Electrification Administration was a New Deal program of the 30s to bring electricity to rural America, an area which could not be profitably served by private utilities. Initially eligible for 2% interest loans, they now supposedly pay market rates for capital. Each local REA has a board of directors, and each board elects one member to sit on the board of directors of CPA and UPA. Throughout this struggle, CPA and UPA have continually pointed out their seemingly democratic structure and control from below. While the boards are the ultimate decision-makers, discussions with farmers who had been on local boards brought out that they were at the mercy of the greater technical expertise and information of management, particularly the general manager. The farmers felt that decisions came from Washington and the local REA just followed orders. Board members are supposed to bring in information from the members, but no information was to go back out. There was never an informed discussion about the powerline decision by the board of directors or the general membership, let alone the the people directly affected.

The project was decided on in 1972. Many of the orders for steel and other materials were placed over the next year and a half. The farmers first heard about the line during the summer of 1974 as the power utilities were attempting to get local governmental approval

for the line. Word spread. The first group-- No Power Lines-- formed. Soon opposition groups were forming in other counties. In Pope county, the county commissioners were against the line and would not OK it. The utilities then did something which the Minnesota Supreme Court said had never been done before-- they voluntarily placed themselves under regulation by a state agency. In April, 1974, the Minnesota legislature passed a Power Plant Siting Act, which provided that the Minnesota Environmental Quality Council would make a final determination on power line routes after extensive public hearings. The Act required a "certificate of need from the Minnesota Energy Agency, hearings to establish a twenty-mile corridor that would contain several possible routes for a power line, hearings to determine the actual route of the line, and an environmental impact statement." (Progressive, Dec., 1977) The new law had provisions for exemptions if construction had already been started on a project. This is what CPA-UPA initially claimed, but they reversed themselves in April, 1975 to get around Pope county opposition. The state regulatory apparatus lumbered into being.

The MEQC hearings held around the state suffered from the Rosemary Woods syndrome-- large portions of the farmers' testimony mysteriously disappeared from the transcripts. The MEQC set up citizens' advisory boards with two farmers out of twenty three. The meager discretion of the committee on the corridor placement was rejected in favor of a path close to one requested by the utilities.

Regulatory agencies are set up by the State to mitigate the worst excesses of capitalism. As has been the history of regulatory agencies in general since they originated at the turn of the century, the Minnesota agencies have become creatures of the industries they are supposed to regulate. They often have no experts of their own and must rely on figures provided by the regulated industry. Such is the case of the MEQC set up to be a body with more comprehensive coverage than the various state agencies. It turns out to be yet another strata of governmental power that prevents people from having their due input into decision-making. When the regulatory agencies do have experts, they often come from the industry being regulated. This case is illustrated by the EIS done for the MEQC by Larry Hartman. Hartman had just quit work for Commonwealth Associates, a company employed by CPA-UPA to choose its corridor. The state EIS used much of the language of the EIS submitted by CPA-UPA. In a subsequent lawsuit, the Minnesota Supreme Court condoned this by saying that the final decision was done by someone else-- a hearing officer, and so it did not matter.

The Department of Health always shows up at nuclear hearings to testify about how bad coal is (which is true) but never shows up at hearings on coal-fired generating plants. In its report dated October 1977 entitled "Public Health and Safety Effects of High-Voltage Overhead Transmission Lines", the Department of Health had 13 recommendations. These included: grounding metal buildings and fences near the line; no refueling of vehicles under the line; and no loading or unloading of school buses under the line. The study contains many statements like this,

Little research to date has been done on the possible biological effects associated with DC transmission lines... (P. III-2)

Extensive human studies, both epidemiological and experimental, have not been conducted. (P. III-4)

With regard to HVDC transmission, insufficient research and experience exists to propose any meaningful performance standards, whether empirically based or otherwise, that have an objective of protecting the public health. (P. III-22)

Effects due to long-term exposure to electric fields are, of course, the area of greatest uncertainty. (P. IV-22)

Yet they gave the go-ahead to the line. While there may be no immediate health hazards, the long-term studies have not been done, making the farmers under the line unwilling

experimental subjects. Long time environmental activist, Russ Hatling, characterizes the Department of Health as being just a whitewash for industry.

The Pollution Control Agency is supposed to monitor the health and safety aspects of the line and of all utilities. As an example of its regulation of utilities, the joke is "on" that the PCA gets trampled by the NSP. Until December, 1977 the NSP would not even send over information on spent nuclear fuel rods. The PCA had to go to the Environmental Library and put together the data itself. Last December, a bargain was struck that NSP would send over the information in return for permission to expand Monticello's nuclear fuel rod storage capacity. The rods will now be 7½ inches apart, with 7 inches being the maximum closeness. The NSP still maintains that they grant the information only out of generosity. They still hold back what they call "proprietary information." This is a ludicrous notion since they are not in competition with anyone, and they are effectively only holding back information from the public.

The MEA has recently been greatly embarrassed. The Minnesota Energy Agency gave the certificate of need to the powerline. They also gave a certificate of need to NSP's Sherco 3 & 4 additions last fall, going along with NSP's urgent pleas to start building even before an EIS. A month later, NSP said they really did not need Sherco 3 & 4 for another year. Then four months later, NSP announced that four of their projected power plants were being delayed a year or more each. So much for need figures of NSP or the MEA.

The farmers have all along questioned CPA-UPA claims of need for the power from the line. When environmentalists like Wendell Bradley, a physicist at Gustavus Adolphus, claimed that NSP had a 1,000 megawatt surplus last summer, which is enough to cover this line, this was especially brought home. CPA-UPA have forecast a 10% growth rate while the industry as a whole was forecasting a 7% growth rate. Actual U.S. figures for 1974 were 1%, for 1975 3%, and for 1976 2%. In addition, we have the Department of Natural Resources, which does not want the line over DNR land because some animals would not approach the line, and some birds would not nest under it.

Farmers lost on taking state agency behavior to the Minnesota Supreme Court. One justice said that the state agencies had "played a passive rather than active role." Correct procedures had not been followed. The EIS "appears to have been constructed in great haste and with little study or input on behalf of the citizens of the state." Yet this judge ruled against the farmers. He did point out in his opinion however the following.

One point to me is obvious: that we cannot stand much more highway and above-ground power line construction without permanently destroying and impairing our environment. The question is where do we stop?(CS-5)

Well, the farmers have been out in the fields saying "stop". Using non-violent obstructionist tactics, the farmers stopped the line in Pope county in 1976 at a place they now call "constitution hill." A moratorium was declared until after the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled. The September 30, 1977 ruling was in CPA-UPA's favor in all nine cases. Survey work started at the North Dakota border. Although there was some opposition in the first two counties, Pope county has been the storm center. Sterns county has also offered militant opposition. When asked why Pope, some farmers feel that it is because the farms are smaller in Pope than in Traverse and Grant where the soil is poorer and more land is needed to make a living. They would not miss the land for a powerline there, but in Pope and Sterns, a tower would be right in your backyard. (Traverse and Grant are sugar beet, flax and sunflower country; Pope is corn, wheat and dairy; Sterns is dairy.) The Pope county governmental apparatus and business community also supports the farmers. Besides the county commissioners, twenty-one mayors have come out in support and no one has been arrested. Even the sheriff dragged his feet for a while, but finally he called in state troopers. When Governor Perpich committed 150 state troopers in January to Pope county, flags were flown at half-mast and some businesses closed. At the end of the first week of troopers, the county attorney resigned, saying that he had sympathy with the farmers and

he did not want to prosecute his friends.

About 85 people have been arrested so far, with most of them from Pope county. The people in this area are not the type to be out getting arrested. Most would consider themselves conservative, but conservative of the land they love and their families supported on the land. They value hard work, independence, and self-reliance. For some, their farms have been in the family for generations and many hope to pass it on to their children. For many, their farms will be their retirement income, and the decrease in value caused by the line threatens their retirement security. Their sense of fair play has been greatly abused. After having gone through administrative, legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government, they are disillusioned with political efficacy at that level. Administrative mistakes have been condoned by the other branches, and the governor has tried to ram policy down their throats.

The use of eminent domain by the power companies has been one of the most aggravating aspects to the farmers. Whereas the king of England had an absolute right to confiscate property perhaps, the fifth amendment to the Constitution provided that just compensation must be made in the event of a "taking." Eminent domain is considered a sovereign power of government, along with taxation and the police power. Not only can government appropriate private property, but private companies, including railroads and utilities can be delegated this power. Most farmers have just received a letter in the mail saying that some of their land has been condemned. In some cases this was done by a "quick claim" where money is just deposited with the county. In Sterns county, only four out of one hundred farmers have picked up their money. Taconite companies have had eminent domain since 1946, and there is a bill in the legislature to take this away. One outcome of this whole affair might be to take eminent domain away from the utilities, but that would be a tough fight indeed.

Leftists tend to be critical of farmers' concern about private property in eminent domain cases. I support the farmers in their struggle against the state. The alternative is large agribusiness, and I would hate to depend on them for food. Leaders of the American Indian Movement have been readily able to identify with the farmers' fight over land, because they know the importance of who owns and controls the land. AIM also knows the importance of the country's energy struggle because there is a lot of coal, oil shale and uranium on Indians' land. They are preparing to prevent a new round of ripoffs.


The generating plant at Underwood, North Dakota is only the first of three or four plants to be built by 1981 with a fan of powerlines. The coal comes from the non-unionized Falkirk Mining Company which is owned by North American Coal Company, the sixth largest in the country. Research still needs to be done on the extent of coal interests and the involvement of various companies. CPA claims that the reason this coal cannot be transported by rail is that lignite coal already has a low B.T.U., and transportation would further lower the B.T.U.s. This may or may not be true. If it is not true, I would hypothesize that they want to get around the high cost of transporting coal. Coal is the mainstay of the Burlington Northern, accounting for their healthy profit margin. In the past, North Dakota and other western states have investigated the possibilities of a coal-slurry pipeline but rejected the idea because of a lack of water. Some people believe that CPA-UPA are just a cover for a way of getting energy to Chicago and St. Louis, because those cities cannot have any more pollution produced near them. CPA-UPA will have excess capacity and the electricity does feed into the Midwest Area Power Pool (MAPP). MAPP acts as an electricity marketplace, and contracts are constantly and continually being made (by the hour) for extra energy. However, transmission does mean line loss. Over the 400 mile DC line, 71 megawatts are lost, whereas if it were AC, 100 megawatts would be lost-- which is the reason for going DC. A line must be more than 200 miles before DC becomes profitable.

As energy generation becomes more centralized, the need for larger power lines are created. This creates more pollution. If Sherco 3 & 4 additions are approved, it will be

the largest coal-fired plant in the U.S.-- 3,000 megawatts. According to studies, sulfur dioxide emission over the seven county metropolitan area will increase by 45%, and there will be 12,000 additional deaths over the 40 year life of the power plant. Already farmers in the Sherco plant area have experienced a 20% decrease in crop yields of soybeans. Farmers around the coalfields in North Dakota have been fighting the coal fields development, saying that the land is needed for food. I wonder if farmers in North Dakota downwind of this know what is in store for them. Environmentalists are fighting for smaller coal plants to spread the pollution around. This can only be a transitional step to the decentralized production of safe, clean, renewable energy, such as solar, wind and methane sources of power. Farmers in southern Minnesota are fighting the large joint NSP, CPA-UPA coal generating plant proposed near Mankato. Composed of two 800 megawatt generators, the plant would take 7,000 acres of land.

And so it goes as farmers continue to fight off the encroachment of suburban development, highways, powerlines and generating plants, and other destruction of farm land. Some states have enacted laws protecting prime farm land, but often it will mean farmers and other citizens banding together to protect agricultural land as well as the rights of the people. I have not yet discussed the aesthetic considerations of this line. Suffice it to say that people do not want these 150 to 190 foot towers looming above the level prairie land. (Silos are about 40 feet high.) The legal cases are beginning to come to trial, and in some cases judges are trying to jack people around. The judges are taking it most slow in Pope county, saying that there cannot be a trial during planting and growing season. This could mean that there will not be any trials until late fall. It is expected that it will be hard to get a jury to convict in Pope county. Money will be needed for legal defense.

The farmers have a button that has a power tower with a slash through it depicted. The button says "If you kill our farms, your cities will die." (Please send \$1 plus postage to the Lowry Town Hall, Lowry, Minnesota.)



**GEOGRAPHY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT:
METHODOLOGICAL OUTLINE OF SOME FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES**

**Juan Rodriguez Fidalgo
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I would like to trace the transformations and problems that have arisen in the approaches taken toward geographical studies of underdevelopment, transformations that are, in many ways, similar to those experienced by geography as a whole.

First of all I believe it necessary to define some features of underdevelopment. Basically it can be said that:

- As a phenomenon associated with capitalist development, underdevelopment possesses a character of historical novelty. You can't, for instance, speak of underdevelopment in the Roman Empire.
- Underdevelopment is a phenomenon that didn't manifest itself in all its breadth until the twentieth century.
- Underdevelopment is a characteristic feature of capitalism which has come to its height in the decades following the Second World War after which the Third World became the geographical site where, preferentially, the principle contradictions of capitalism enunciated by Marx were manifested: "concentration of capital," "progressive pauperization of the proletariat," "an industrial reserve army," etc. Thus we can affirm that the hegemonic countries transfer a large part of their own internal contradictions to the Third World, sharpening to the maximum those contradictions that already existed.

This geographical region constitutes a large portion of the globe whose landscapes combine these contradictions in a very unique form. Underdeveloped countries have been converted - due to the analogous processes devastating them - into an internally diversified but, in more fundamental ways, singular reality that superimposes itself upon all other divisions, be they climatic, geological, cultural, racial, or otherwise. The products of a complex but unified combination of economic, historic, natural and other factors, these landscapes must be the object of a critical, sociological method that analyzes them in terms of their relations to man, their inhabitants.

But there is not just one geographical method, nor has there been just one at any point in geographic history.

THE DIVERSE APPROACHES TAKEN TOWARDS THE "GEOGRAPHY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT"

What we would call the "prehistory" of the "Geography of Underdevelopment" would broadly encompass the period from the end of the fifteenth century until the middle of this century (in general, the period of the universalization of capitalism).

A "Geography of Underdevelopment" as we understand it today did not exist during this period. However, as the studies of Brian Hudson have demonstrated,¹ geography as a rule functioned with very close ties to colonizing powers and it is often difficult to distinguish between the prejudices of geography and the rationalized techniques of military domination and economic exploitation prevalent in the colonies.²

I will try to illustrate this point using the example of the Central American Republic of Honduras. In 1837 the Californian William V. Wells published a voluminous book entitled Explorations and Adventures in Honduras.³ In this volume he describes his observations occasioned by a trip through Honduras; a trip made by him with the intention of reporting on the country's mining potential to a North American company. We can read in the pages of this book numerous extremely valuable geographical observations, including the following affirmations:

That one of the best mining countries in the world, situated in the natural path of our commercial route, has been left unoccupied by North Americans, is unexplainable...

The subscription of a contract between proprietors of these mineral-rich zones and a North American company would result in the exploitation of the mines with a common benefit for the entire world... The precious timberlands of Honduras deserve special attention. There exists a great variety and quantity of precious timber... In a country so gifted by nature, watered by rivers that connect the most remote regions of its interior with the ocean and the most vast and valuable forest zones knowns, the transactions that could be made have preference over any others.

Such geographical observations initiated processes which have been so devastating for Honduras that today the country is:

- The most backward Central American country.
- Left with all its mining resources exploited and exported by North American companies.
- Left with a large portion of its best forest soils totally denuded and exhausted to the point of provoking massive floods of mud and water over the entire Northern Coast when the rains of hurricane Fifi struck in the fall of 1975. Unrestrained by any protective vegetation, the rains of the hurricane caused the deaths of more than 10,000 people, not to mention the destruction of the entire transportation infrastructure in the most important economic region of the country and the human hardships that later resulted from the loss of crops and livestock.

Thus it should be evident that the "Geography of Underdevelopment" is not a very neutral or objective science, contrary to the beliefs of many.

But actually, during the period previously discussed, underdevelopment was not even considered to be part of geographic study. A "Geography of Underdevelopment," per se, only began to emerge during the 1950s, when it is possible to detect the presence of several different methodological approaches:

1. The approach which we can call positivism is characterized by what appears to be a most superficial description of underdevelopment: long lists of deluding demographic indices, sectoral divisions of the population, distribution of revenue, migratory contingents, reductionist models (the "peripheral center" of Prebisch, Henshall's agricultural activity models, diffusion models, and even some rash attempts to provide a literal application of Von Thunen's model). Such data and models fill a major part of the pages in geographical studies with interminable, undigested, numerical series. We are presented with space in the form of a static photograph, without history, without life, without internal class conflicts. Also, these studies are based upon the thesis that underdevelopment is really simply undevelopment, an inferior and antecedent stage of development. For that reason, when confronted with apparent anomalies, this geography offers reformist "solutions" to correct divergent tendencies and place the Third World countries back upon the path of development. Such a perspective can never recognize or suggest the necessity for major structural transformations of the "status quo." I assume that the major criticisms that this type of geography deserves are well known. Nevertheless, I do want to emphasize that this type of geographical study is often rooted in a dangerous inferiority complex which plagues many geographers; a fear that we are practicing a profession which is "not strictly scientific," "unsystematic," or "unquantifiable." This complex is derived from a false and narrow comprehension of science, a comprehension profoundly linked to the dominant ideology.
2. Another extremely dangerous approach is one which we would call "demographistic" and starts with the assumption that underdevelopment is a phenomenon very closely tied to the recent population explosion and consequently searches for a solution in the politics of population control (usually supporting coercion where "necessary").
3. The Culturalist-Anthropological approach is another way of dealing with the "Geography of Underdevelopment" and especially prevalent in African studies. Here underdevelopment is presented as if it were an archaic, semi-tribal cultural condition or a condition caused by the rupture of a traditional society and its moral values, a rupture that creates certain "cultural" and "moral" imbalances.

4. Geography of underdevelopment as the "geography of hunger and tropical diseases" also appears in numerous studies (see P. Gourou and J. de Castro).

It should be noted, of course, that almost none of the approaches mentioned above is presented in a chemically pure state and that, in my opinion, there still exists in all of them a certain dose of physical determinism.

THE BREAK WITH PHYSICAL DETERMINISM

I believe that a definitive break with physical determinism appears with the work of Ives Lacoste, where for the first time there is an attempt to define underdevelopment as a complex phenomenon of many interrelated factors (economic, historical, social class structure, etc.). Lacoste tries to establish a point of departure for future geographic investigation and introduces the idea that academic geography should be more active than descriptive.⁴

Later other general studies emerged, such as Zonal Geography of the Hot Regions by Durant Dastes, Urban Geography of Underdeveloped Countries by M. Santos, and Geography of Latin America by C. Colin Delavaud. These are books in which there appears a firm rejection of physical determinism and a displacement of the problem to economic and historical factors and in which data, demographic and other, are considered an effect and not a cause and where environmental surroundings do no more than act to define the scene and the human activities (determined by the level of economic dependence and colored by the medium) explain the regional varieties within the frame of underdevelopment.

GEOGRAPHY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCE THEORIES

The revitalization of the Marxist theory of ideology, brought about by the school of Althusser in France and the Frankfurt school in Germany, will be closely connected to the emergence of Marxist geographical thought, which will revolutionize geographical studies. Geography thus begins to question the ideology which may underlie its methods of investigation and from this questioning there will emerge a profound revision.

A theoretical Marxist approach does not totally lack tradition in modern geography. Years ago Pierre George declared that "the agrarian landscape is inseparable from the society that created it and the point of departure for Human Geography is the inventory of the Productive Forces and their relationships." But the consequences of this affirmation had never been brought out into the open, much less the ideological character of the geographer's task. This criticism of geography from the point of view of ideology was first initiated in France but has reached a high level of activity in the radical North American school that revolves around the journal Antipode.

The first practical works appear in the intermediate field between geography and urban sociology. A spatial study is attempted as something fundamentally determined by the effective system of capitalist production. Marxist postulates are strictly used as the basis from which to begin. Absolute primacy of the present production relationships within spatial structuralization is affirmed as well as the spatial manifestation of the system's contradictions in the form of maladjustments such as demographic explosion, marginality of habitat, and other similar phenomena so frequently encountered in underdeveloped countries. In one word, the "Althusserian" postulate that historical materialism is the only possible scientific standard for an analysis of the reality is accepted.

Although Lenin had already pointed to this path in his book about Imperialism, it was not until the appearance of the first dependence theories that Marxist geography of underdevelopment was able to count on a more or less solid economic theory for its investigations. These early dependence theories described the articulation of capitalism present in underdeveloped countries not as pre-capitalism but as a dependent capitalism in which decisions affecting production and consumption are made externally. Dependent capitalism is a

structural situation which occurred in part because of the necessity of capitalism to overcome pressing contradictions in the bosom of its originating countries.

We now have a clear explanatory model that will permit an analysis of underdevelopment from a previous theoretic outline, avoiding digressions and generalities characteristic of anterior geographic work. This point contains in its essence as well a criticism of the type of empirical reformist study discussed earlier.

The study of M. Castells⁶ of Latin American cities, in which he tries to establish a classification of these cities to conform to the diverse levels of dependence set up by Cardoso and Faletto⁷ is the first more daring attempt to explain this model in action.

Undoubtedly, this geographical activity is not lacking in serious problems.⁸ The concept of dependence (as well as varying among the diverse authors) implies a high level of abstraction of the reality. Can phenomena so complex as the spatial organization of a country be deduced from dependence--and fundamentally from it--forgetting everything else, topography, location of natural resources, climate, etc.? The utilization of dependence to explain everything can lead us, also, to forget the importance within the underdeveloped countries of internal class strife. Geography has to pay attention to such criticism. There is still another basic criticism to be made of geography today. After centuries of existence with barely a few serious methodological reflections, geography (and especially radical geography) now pours too much of its energies into reflection upon method, somewhat neglecting the field analysis so fundamental for its advancement. For example, of twenty-one essays in the book Radical Geography⁹, a summary of current radical geography in North America, only four focus on concrete themes, while the rest are general methodological observations.

After centuries of servitude to colonialism and imperialism, the geography of underdevelopment has discovered, by means of incorporating the theory of dependence, a new instrument to transform itself into a science to work toward the liberation of an oppressed humanity. Setting forth upon this task of liberation is how, I believe, geography will regain its confidence as a science, and not in the search for abstract mathematical and geometric models.

I believe, also, that the only way to validate the valuable methodological reflections elaborated recently with Marxist theory as a guide is to contrast them with concrete landscape studies. This is the way to mature the geographic conception of underdevelopment, just recently born, without resorting to dogmatism or to abstract lucubrations.

SOME POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVES

There are two tasks for the geography of underdevelopment today. One is that the geographer should be an advertiser of ideas, because the role of the propagandist is fundamental for all the social sciences and because, after all, the printing press is more often than not the only power the social sciences have. Tied to this, the geographer has to transform himself into a critic who demystifies false conceptions of the landscape spread by the dominant ideology. In order to accomplish this the first thing to be done is to abandon the term "geography of underdevelopment" and start referring to the geography of the exploited, or dominated, countries.

Geography, with its plastic character, its comprehensive understanding of the landscape, its approach to man as he truly is, its traditional bond to the "humanities", and the limited sophistication of its method, is much more comprehensible to the average person than complicated statistical surveys, sophisticated political theses, or complicated economic analysis. Geography can be used, therefore, as an affective instrument for a popular consciousness-raising.

Consequently, to allow in ourselves an inferiority complex because of the apparent simplicity of our science could be a serious mistake. A child could understand Lacoste's

essay about the geography of warfare, which is nonetheless a model of what science and geography are.¹⁰

A vast and virgin field of study lies before "the geography of the exploited countries". I would suggest an emphasis on a concrete study of two particular areas. The articulation of the landscape in socialist republics of the Third World would provide a point of reference for the confrontation with capitalist underdevelopment. The other perspective would be the study of South Africa, a country in which appears with an extraordinary clarity the two faces of the international capitalist structure.

A major problem with geography today is that it has been torn from the patronage that used to fund overseas trips in exchange for valuable information about raw materials and other useful (including human) resources in the Third World. Geography finds itself obligated, for compelling economic reasons, to the narrow and myopic interests of academic professionalism. Perhaps this is the authentic explanation for the predominance of methodological studies over field work.

Footnotes

1. "Geography and Imperialism", Antipode, Sept. 1977.
2. I. Lacoste, La géographie, ça sert, d'abord, à faire la guerre (Paris: Maspero, 1976); R. Santibanez, "Control de l'espace et controle social dans l'etat militaire chilien", Herodote 5 (1977); T. Varlin, "Pinochet geographe", Herodote 5 (1977).
3. William W. Wells, Explorations and Adventures in Honduras, Comprising Sketches of Travel in the Gold Regions of Olancho, and a Review of the History and General Resources of Central America (New York: Harper & Bros., 1857).
4. I. Lacoste, Géographie du sous-développement. Géopolitique d'une crise (Paris: P.U.F., 1976, 3rd edition).
5. P. George, Active Geography.
6. M. Castells, Imperialismo y urbanización en América Latina (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1973).
7. F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1969).
8. For criticism of Castells (footnote 6): P.I. Singer, Urbanización, dependencia y marginalidad en América Latina.
9. R. Peet (ed.), Radical Geography (Chicago: Maaroufa Press, 1977).
10. I. Lacoste, "Enquete sur le bombardement des digues du fleuve Rouge (Vietnam, etc 1972), Methode d'analyse et reflexions d'ensemble", Herodote 1 (1976). This French version is more complete than that published in Antipode 5 (1973).

* * *

The Internal Revenue Service announced that 90% of America's richest citizens did not pay a penny in taxes last year... Another IRS spokesman was reported to have said that this was not so surprising inasmuch as the rich rarely do any work.

TREASURER'S REPORT

31 August 1979

Balance	31 April 1978*				\$1153.99
Revenues from 1 May 1978 to 31 August 1979					\$2113.17
(1)	Dues and Donations to 31 April 1979				\$1147.42
(2)	Dues and Donations to 31 August 1979**				\$ 330.79
(3)	Interest Received to 31 August 1979				\$ 155.80
(4)	Special Subsidy Fund***				\$ 218.60
(5)	Payment from British Isles for Newsletters				\$ 260.56
Expenditures from 1 May 1978 to 31 August 1979					\$1175.26
(1)	Newsletter to USG International				\$ 751.03
	<u>Volume</u>	<u># Copies</u>	<u>Printing</u>	<u>Postage</u>	
	III-4	250	\$ 89.60	\$36.00	
	IV-1	200	\$ 71.92	\$37.14	
	IV-2	248	\$ 76.30	\$34.73	
	IV-3	300	\$227.48	\$34.66****	
	IV-4	300	\$107.25	\$35.95	
(2)	Newsletter to USG Britain and Ireland				\$ 260.56
	IV-1	100	\$ 33.08	\$28.13	
	IV-2	100	\$ 37.30	\$ 0.00	
	IV-3	100	\$ 75.83	\$24.77	
	IV-4	100	\$ 35.75	\$25.70	
(3)	Envelopes				\$ 48.77
(4)	Telegrams, telephone, misc. postage, checks				\$ 48.40
(5)	USG Annual General Meeting May 1978				\$ 18.50
(6)	USG Annual General Meeting May 1979				\$ 48.00
Balance 31 August 1979					\$2091.90

* All monies are in Canadian funds which are approximately worth \$.85 US and £.388 UK.

** This is below the rate at which we received dues last year.

*** This subsidy fund will not be replicated in 1979-80.

**** IV-3 cost more to print because of the strike lockout at Simon Fraser University which forced us to do printing privately.

Nathan Edelson
Treasurer