A Radical Journal of Geography
ANTIPODE

Angus McNelly, *Now We Are in Power: The Politics of Passive Revolution in Twenty-First-Century Bolivia*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2023. ISBN: 9780822947783 (cloth); ISBN: 9780822989929 (ebook)

In the meandering yet incisive *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?*, Göran Therborn (1978: 35) suggests that:

> …a bourgeois revolution, involving the distribution of land to individual peasants, is inherently unstable if it is accomplished by a predominantly proletarian state apparatus of the kind created in Russia after October. Conversely, the nationalization of the "commanding heights" of the economy is unstable as an expression of working class power, if it is carried out by a bourgeois state apparatus.

What, then, happens to a political project aimed at the redistribution of land to Indigenous peasants, as well as an (ostensible) nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy in the service of "resource nationalism", when it is undertaken by an Indigenous-led political party operating through a postcolonial capitalist state? The contradictions that arise from this mismatch between the socio-economic transformations proposed, and the institutional ensembles through which they are sought, has been widely debated in the case of Bolivia under the Indigenous-led *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) party, spanning (among others) anthropology, critical geography, and international relations (e.g. Bjork-James 2020; Delgado 2021; Fabricant 2012; Farthing and Kohl 2014; Goodale 2019; Gustafson 2020; Hindery 2014; Maclean 2023; Marston 2024; Paige 2020; Webber 2011). Given the breadth of analysis on this topic, one might think that there would be little left to say on the matter. Yet Angus McNelly's *Now We Are in Power: The Politics of Passive Revolution in Twenty-First-Century Bolivia* provides a fresh take on this well-studied topic, through a theoretically sophisticated and empirically rich exploration of Indigenous struggles and the fraught conquest of political power.

Building upon previous Marxian approaches to Bolivia's grassroots politics, political economy, and political geography, the central contribution of the book stems from McNelly's unorthodox take on "passive revolution" as the motor force in the making of the pluri-

national state. While Gramsci's concept of passive revolution has been widely deployed in contemporary scholarship on Latin America's left turn (see e.g. Modonesi 2013; Roio 2012; Quevedo 2019), and Bolivia in particular (Andreucci 2017; Hesketh 2020; Hesketh and Morton 2014; Webber 2016, 2017), McNelly synthesises a number of distinct conceptual approaches across the extant scholarship, including Massimo Modonesi's sociology of social movements, Chris Hesketh and Adam Morton's socio-spatial analysis, and Jeffery Webber's Marxian political economy. All of this is woven through the Bolivian intellectual René Zavaleta Mercado's concept of *sociedad abigarrada*, or "motley society". These complementary dimensions constitute the central foci of the book, namely, Indigenous/working class movements, regional tensions, and natural resource extraction—the social, spatial, and material (p.5). Though certainly challenging for the reader, the deft integration of all these theoretical elements provides a depth of analysis that is rare across contemporary studies of Bolivian politics.

Chapter 1 opens with the familiar story of Bolivia's wars, specifically over gas. Immediately, the spatial and temporal dimensions come into view; the city of El Alto was itself turned into a "tool of struggle", transforming the urban landscape into a terrain of warfare with ditches, blockades, and spatial disruptions. In situating "Black October" within the longer history of rebellion and revolution, the crisis of the neoliberal state comes into sharper focus. From this extended narrative emerges key actors like the Bolivian Workers' Centre (*Central Obrera Boliviana*, COB), and the highland and lowland Indigenous movements of the 1970s (with CONAMAQ and CIDOB respectively). The complex historical evolution of these movements cannot be adequately captured here, but the detail in this chapter brings the reader right to the heart of the conflict that burst into view in that fateful month of October 2003, when a series of struggles over coca eradication, tax reform, and gas exports erupted into a city-wide rebellion. This concatenation of crisis and class struggle is framed through Gramsci's notion of "catharsis", in which a crisis of hegemony "triggers processes of passive revolution" (p.32). This "moment" provides the cipher to postcolonial social formations as the peripheries of global capitalism, structured by *abigarramiento*. At that moment, different temporalities share a "common time: that of politics", where the absence of state authority brings the contradictory relations between different social forces into full view (p.33).

Internally related to the moment of catharsis is that of "transformism", in which individual political figures become integrated into the state/party (as the principal agent of passive revolution), and latterly entire sections of the popular classes become absorbed into a passive revolutionary project (p.49). This moment of transformism comprises the foundation for Chapter 2, which presents a complex yet focused analysis of the preconditions for the rise of the MAS, as well as the subsequent "fragmentation of the social forces" under its rule (p.48). Here McNelly introduces two principal vectors of incorporation: "technocratic incorporation of social movement demands" and "right-wing destabilization tactics" (p.55). Each can be seen through differential components of the MAS's strategy of reproduction, particularly the "faux nationalization" of the gas sector and the highly compromised Constituent Assembly on the one hand, and the emergence of "autonomy battles" among right-wing forces on the other. In one case we find the "temporal politics in state managerialism" (p.57), and in the other the fracturing of the "two Bolivias" (p.59) by right-wing rebellions. In going beyond contemporary Marxian approaches to state incorporation, McNelly offers a different angle of approach, emphasising the "messiness of everyday life" and the shifting terrain of support and opposition (p.64). This agency-centred methodology provides a sensitivity to the shifting subjectivities of the *sociedad abigarrada.* With particular focus on the MAS-organized School of Political Formation (SPF), the extensity of the state's passive revolution is revealed to be more limited and contested than it first appears.

Chapter 3 brings a more forensic dissection of the preconditions of social movement incorporation mentioned above. The struggle over the "two Bolivias", with right-wing forces seeking a *de facto* fragmentation of national sovereignty, brings to the foreground the politics of space and scale. Invoking Zavaleta's notion of "crisis as method", McNelly frames the autonomy battles as a moment in which "the social threads of a society fray and are laid bare for all to see" (p.76). The contemporary social (and spatial) conflicts are placed within a broader historical context—from landlordism to mineral extraction (p.79-94)—across the long arc of Bolivia's long 20th century. The culmination of these struggles over space, resources, and representation ultimately diluted the political reach of the MAS government, leading to both the completion of social movement incorporation (as a bulwark against right-wing attacks), as well as endless compromises with separatist forces, signifying the renewed

"hegemony of capital accumulation through *new emergent sociospatial configurations of power*" (p.100).

If these contingent socio-spatial transformations reflected the waning leverage of transformism, they were ultimately compensated for by the re-valorisation of Evo Morales as a figure imbued with multiple meanings. Chapter 4 deciphers the semiotics of Bolivia's first Indigenous president, by deconstructing the persona of Morales as at once "sublime" and "profane", referring, on the one hand, to his representation as a figure transcending time—as "the culmination of centuries of struggle" (p.108)—and, on the other, his actual embodiment as an Indigenous peasant. Thus, as one component to the politics of passive revolution, this fetishised persona was itself a "double-edged sword", where both victories and defeats were laid squarely at Morales' feet. This unstable form of "Caeserism"—a "third force" that enters the political terrain to break the social impasse between contending classes—brings more focus to the contradictory elements of Morales' passive revolution. In representing Bolivian society's two bodies (its profane natural wealth, and the sublime figure of the nation), Morales sought to build an "Indigenous state", through new regulations on Indigenous language for state employees, which at the same time allowed for the relative pacification of society during the expansion of extractivism. The rise of infrastructural planning and extractivism were at once a "spectacle" of the state—thus entrancing the people through the wonders of "modernity"—as well as a strategy to overcome "the spatial and scalar tensions underpinning the *proceso de cambio*" (p.121).

In the final two chapters, we find a long process of material transformation and crises of national accumulation (Chapter 5), and the eventual decline of *Hermano Evo*. Here McNelly goes beyond conventional accounts of passive revolution in Bolivia, largely stuck at the level of politics and social movements, towards a materialist reading of resource frontiers, extractive infrastructures, and the class conflicts that arise from them. Extractive sectors (in both agriculture and mining) contained a "kernel of promised modernity" (p.131). As McNelly rightly asks, "When governments 'sow the oil', what grows?". In the case of Bolivia under the MAS, it was an entirely new (or expanded) spatialisation project geared towards enhancing the circulation of capital across national territories: railways, highways, and pipelines. This was seen in its most expansive form in the region-wide IIRSA project (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America) (p.146),

transmuting the colonial practice of cartographic abstraction—erasing the lived presence of Indigenous communities from map-making—into a seemingly autonomous form of regional development, with the TIPNIS highway as perhaps the most egregious example. As a consequence, infrastructures necessary for everyday life went (largely) unaddressed. In this sense, it was "employment", not infrastructure, that was the magical elixir deemed necessary to sustain the body politic.

The final chapter unpacks the determinants that led to the "end of Evo Morales". Catalysed by the February 21st referendum (21F) on extending presidential term limits, this legislative move expressed the unfinished socio-spatial process of pacification (p.162, 169). It also reflected the relative transition towards a type of "authoritarian populism" (Tilzey 2021), as a function of the relative fissure of a hegemonic project brought about by the crisis in the reproduction of the capitalist state, and of state managers' inability to keep the reigning power bloc cohesive. This disintegration took a strange turn when a series of forest fires were used by the landed elite as a type of ecological critique against the MAS, once again highlighting the ways in which every crisis was laid at the feet of Morales (p.166). Most fundamentally of all, the waning fortunes of the Morales government were expressive of the wider crisis of regional political economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The end of the "commodity super-cycle" asphyxiated the prevailing "commodity consensus". Inherent limits to the expansion of domestic production, as well as the lack of expertise, led to a drag on endogenous industrialisation (p.168).

McNelly usefully reviews the lacklustre results across the national labour market, with falling rates of wage employment during the commodity boom (2008-2011). Yet the mechanics of the informal economy during this period led to its own form of class differentiation, with the circulation of cash leading to more quotidian forms of uneven development, wealth concentration, and the emergence of a local petty bourgeoisie, largely within commercial fractions and small-scale coca growers (p.175). While the minimum wage doubled in real terms (2005-2015), wages as a percentage of GDP fell below the average for the wider Latin American region (despite growing 0.15%). Thus, Bolivia's wages/GDP ratio barely moved compared to the regional average during this period. All in all, economic resentment congealed into the urban opposition against Morales (largely mobilised around abstract, liberal norms of "democracy"). Yet just as the sublime/profane dialectic of the

Morales government provided a relative safety valve for the reproduction of passive revolution—by linking any and all gains to the personality of Morales himself—this strength would eventually translate into a debilitating weakness, with frustrated class ambitions directly ascribed to the failings of the plurinational state, and thus the president himself (p.177-178).

Now We Are in Power offers a significant contribution to contemporary scholarship on Bolivian politics, by adding deeper layers of "space and time", and thus "drawing links between the political processes of passive revolution and how they play out in the material world" (p.192). Yet the depth and sophistication of such a book also raises a number of questions around key aspects that remain somewhat unresolved.

Populist Presidents, Integral States, Temporal Traps

It is, on the one hand, admirable that the author does not intend to get bogged down into (often) sterile debates around populism and its role in radical politics (of whichever stripe). In particular, McNelly substitutes a theory of populism with the "political economy" of passive revolution, which better situates the dynamics of Morales' government within the material transformations of the commodities boom at various spatial scales. On the other hand, there may have been a missed opportunity here. Indeed, given this (very welcome) materialist analysis, it seems odd that the focus should lean so heavily on "leaders and leadership" (p.111)—the bread and butter of populism *qua* political theory. True, the study of leadership need not fall into the rabbit hole of "populist reason", or some such mystificatory term. What is curious about McNelly's materialist reading of Morales' leadership is that what appears before the reader is precisely a Marxist theory of populism *in nuce*.[1]

As Michael Bray (2015: 44) suggests, the class-relational foundation of populist projects tends towards a state form that "must be made truly representative because it comes to be seen as the site where political and economic independence can be forced into alignment, where the independence of agents in subordinated positions could be produced and defended" (cf. p.125). Thus, "[d]emocratisation is the answer to economic indenture. The state, co-opted to produce this dependence, must be put back in the peoples' hands to (re)produce their 'independence'" (Bray 2015: 44). Of course, the specific *form* through

[1] For a recent Marxian contribution to the puzzle of Latin American populism, see Webber (2025).

which this imaginary of "independence" emerges is historically and socially specific, from the notion of independence *qua* wage-labour in early Western industrial society, to more collectivist notions within ISI development projects (Bray 2015: 45; cf. Hesketh 2017: 404). Each imaginary of independence speaks to the particular characteristics of a national-popular base and the specific challenges it seeks to overcome (Hesketh 2019: 1488-1489).

From McNelly's analysis, the central character of the "national-popular" congeals within the *plurinational state*, while the principal challenge facing the MAS was how to transcend the status quo of a decrepit neoliberal state that shifted the social costs of privatisation onto the shoulders of most marginalised groups. These elements thus combined to form a specific populist project based on the conquering of the site where political and economic independence can be forced into alignment (state apparatus), as well as the democratisation of "the economic" via the transformation of the state's constitutional basis. As noted above, much of the book's narrative can be retraced along these lines, from the influx of Indigenous peoples into the organs of the state administration—a "plurinational bureaucracy" (p.52)—through to the rewriting of the constitution in order to forge "direct [Indigenous] representation … as collective subjects, in accordance with their customary practices" (p.57). As compromised as this political realignment may have been, in my view the author has already taken us most of the way towards a class-relational reading of populism within the MAS.

Like the hushed whispers of populism within the interstices of the book, the function and concept of the state is all-pervasive yet effectively mute. This again recalls the significance of Morales as a (populist?) political figure, whose very centrality (in all of its sublime/profane contradictions) denotes a particular path of Bolivian state formation. While Gramsci's concept of the "integral state" is invoked as a cipher to the "*Hermano Evo*" effect (p.124-125), the mobilisation of this concept remains somewhat imprecise. Thus, the "integral state" under the MAS is not subject to much interrogation, nor analytical examination.[2] It is simply asserted that the modern integral state is "differentiated" from "its previous forms [by] … the presence of both consent and coercion" (p.125). But Gramsci's

[2] Here it may have been useful to more fully engage with Zavaleta's Gramscian-inspired notion of the "apparent state", as the function of Bolivia's *formación abigarrada*, and the counterpart of Gramsci's integral state (see Augsburger 2021; Freeland 2019).

specification of the bourgeois state is more finessed than this. Indeed, political power under pre-capitalist modes of production were still reproduced through mechanisms of *conformity*, where a minimum of "consent" was achieved as a means of cohering antagonistic classes into an organic society through their own "organic intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971: 242, f.n. 42; see also Bromley 2010). What distinguishes the modern capitalist state is not simply the presence of consent *qua* "hegemony". Rather, consent (or conformity) is conjured through the state apparatus as an "educator" (Gramsci 1971: 260), by way of a novel form of knowledge-power mediated by an entirely new cadre of organic intellectuals (lawyers, sociologists, technocrats, etc.)—those tasked with forging "[t]he world of production, of labor … [in which] collective and individual life must be organised to the maximum yield of the productive apparatus" (Gramsci 1995: 277).

This particular function of socio-economic statecraft is thus somewhat scattered throughout the narrative, peppered instead by a more complex web of space, time, infrastructure, and extractivism. Interesting as this analytical terrain is, the intersections between temporality, spatialisation, accumulation, and political power appear held together by a more fine-grained, agency-centred register, a register that nevertheless feels second-tier. An interesting example is given with the arch-typical organic intellectual, vice president Álvaro García Linera, who exhibited an "unwillingness to supplant the existing state bureaucracy", itself reflective of a tendency towards "colonial discourse" (p.53-54). But this elides a key contradiction. Supplanting the existing state bureaucracy carries with it a host of strategic challenges for any radical-transformative project. Indeed, at other points in the book, this problem is obliquely referenced, as in the case of Abel Mamani, who, "despite lacking technical and administrative experience" (p.69), was appointed minister of public works. Yet instead of making infrastructures work, Mamani "placed the sectoral interests of FEJUVE-El Alto first", by offering government jobs to insiders. One consequence of this was the eventual turn to the cadre of *invitados* as a distinct group of organic intellectuals—academics, lawyers, and other professionals carried over from the old regime possessing adequate technical knowledge of administrative organs (p.121-122). Thus, while the mechanics of passive revolution are refracted through a decidedly materialist framework centred on time, space, and infrastructures, it sometimes feels as if these structural determinations themselves possess active agency, while social actors fall susceptible to, or become subsumed under,

larger structural forces. Conversely, the sophisticated analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 may have exuded more vitality with a slightly tighter focus on the quotidian contradictions between different agent strategies—namely, political patronage, technical problem solving, and the materiality of legitimacy/dissent (cf. p. 153, 156).

My final reflections are on the question of temporality itself in the (un)making of the plurinational state. The discussion of temporal horizons embedded within certain material processes—e.g. extractivism, or social movement struggles—appear at one point to become incongruent, and at another convergent. So in one instance, an incongruence emerges from the different spatial scales of extractivism/wealth distribution—for instance with the system of decentralised fiscal flows—that "shifted the horizons of change away from longer-term projects seeking to generate structural change", towards more local infrastructure projects spanning one-five years (p.157). This would, at first glance, imply that the organic horizons of popular movements tend towards long-term temporalities oriented towards (post-capitalist?) emancipation. At the same time, while the process of extractivism seems to displace the long-termism of structural change (p.131), in another instance, "some social movements struggled against the commodification of nature, viewing natural gas (naively or not) as a pathway to a world beyond capitalism" (p.141), suggesting that at least some fractions of the popular classes may see a convergence between the temporalities of extractivism and emancipation, perhaps even belying their own "promised teleolog[y]" (p.196).

This apparent incongruent/convergent overlap raises two puzzles. Firstly, why should short-term time horizons come under such critical scrutiny? Is there no political saliency of time horizons that *do* span a mere "one- or five-year timeframe" (p.157)? How can the rhythms of everyday life extend themselves (indefinitely) into the long-term horizons of socialist transformation in the absence of meeting the immediate needs of the community? The central strategic challenge here is recognising that the long road to socialism is made up of many smaller steps. This is not simply a half-hearted cheer for "reformism". Rather, the fruits of any political project must bear themselves in a timely manner, lest the impression of abandonment (of "being forgotten" [p.174]) takes hold of the political base.[3]

[3] Indeed, there is a telling slippage at the end of the book, in which an (unintended?) antinomy is established between "alternative futures" and "viable policy goals" (p.191). One might wonder how an alternative future

Secondly, and more generally, it seems as if agents are permanently trapped between two temporal rhythms that ultimately lead to the same endpoint—passive revolution. If local infrastructures and extractive industries "pull in opposite temporal directions … [yet] work together to eliminate alternative futures imagined beyond extractive-led development", then precisely what kind of temporality would be adequate to a radical project of change? Despite McNelly's wish to depict passive revolution as incongruent, contradictory, and incomplete, its temporal cage almost presents itself as a "forgone conclusion" (p.63). The only detectable escape route might be alternative temporalities amplifying political horizons that "look beyond the state and infrastructure" (p.157). But then what precisely is the content of this seemingly empty horizon devoid of both the state *and* infrastructure? In every civilizational formation, the reproduction of society was fundamentally mediated through the production of infrastructures—from the Inca Empire to feudal Europe (Garrido and Salazar 2017; Lubbock 2024: Chapter 1). And any revolutionary horizon will in all likelihood require *more* infrastructure, not less, albeit those geared towards collective consumption and ecological sustainability (Lombardozzi and Pitts 2020).

Likewise, the construction of collective infrastructures—transport, public services, education/training (particularly within strategic sectors like agriculture/agroecology, both urban and rural)—especially envisioned through a more participatory mode of planning, would suggest a more complex engagement (and transformation) with (and of) "state" institutions, rather than a retreat into a thousand self-governing entities (Durrant and Cohen 2024). Though the place of the centralised sovereign state in Bolivia has come under concerted critique (e.g. Hesketh 2020, 2025; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010; Salgado 2023), the invocation of the *ch'ixi*, "new territorialities", or "post-colonial sovereignty", may not square with the pressures, demands, and problematics faced by any polity seeking substantive transition. It may well be, *pace* Therborn, that an attempt to nationalise the commanding heights of the economy, even under an Indigenous ruling party, remains inherently unstable if

might be built on the foundation of *unviable* policy goals. For example, the expansion of agroecological production within urban centres, as an alternative (or partial answer) to large-scale industrial agriculture and food import dependency, may well be a viable policy goal in the medium term; the abolition of the money commodity, as the general form of equivalence/exchange, may not. But to establish so fine a distinction between alternative futures and viable policy seems overly debilitating from the perspective of political strategy.

carried out within the bourgeois (colonial) state. If anything, McNelly's incisive analysis has shown just that. But if indeed these alternative emancipatory political geographies cannot "solve climate change or global poverty" (Salgado 2023: 90), then arguably the most tragic element of what Andreas Malm (2020: 151) dubs the "dreary bourgeois state" is that we simply can't do without it (for now).

If my comments and reflections somewhat appear as *commentarios abigarrados*, it is only because a book of this kind resists simple interpretation. *Now We Are in Power* is to be pored over, not lightly read. Its breathless sweep across theory and history demands great attention, and an appetite to wade through the thickets of critical analysis in order to emerge to the other side of a deeply engaging recollection of one of Latin America's most enigmatic examples of popular power and its eventual demise. Rather than deriving a series of theoretical or empirical critiques, I found myself confronted with a multitude of questions, only some of which I offer above. It is from the book's stimulation to further questioning that future scholars of Bolivia and the Latin American Pink Tide more broadly will benefit immeasurably.

References

Andreucci D (2017) Resources, regulation, and the state: Struggles over gas extraction and passive revolution in Evo Morales's Bolivia. *Political Geography* 61:170-180

Augsburger A (2021) The plurinational state and Bolivia's *formación abigarrada*. *Third World Quarterly* 42(7):1566–1582

Bjork-James C (2020) *The Sovereign Street: Making Revolution in Urban Bolivia*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press

Bray M (2015) Rearticulating contemporary populism: Class, state, and neoliberal society. *Historical Materialism* 23(3):27-64

Bromley S (2010) Politics and the international. In A Anievas (ed) *Marxism and World Politics: Contesting Global Capitalism* (pp231–247). New York: Routledge

Delgado A C T (2021) *Internal Colonialism and International Relations: Tracks of Decolonization in Bolivia*. New York: Routledge

Durrant D and Cohen T (2024) An infrastructural pathway to degrowth: The role of deliberation. *Democratic Theory* 11(1):92–115

Fabricant N (2012) *Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics and the Struggle over Land*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press

Farthing L C and Kohl B H (2014) *Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change*. Austin: University of Texas Press

Freeland A (2019) Motley society, plurinationalism, and the integral state: Álvaro García Linera's use of Gramsci and Zavaleta. *Historical Materialism* 27(3):99–126

Garrido F and Salazar D (2017) Imperial expansion and local agency: A case study of labor organization under Inca rule. *American Anthropologist* 119(4):631–644

Goodale M (2019) *A Revolution in Fragments: Traversing Scales of Justice, Ideology, and Practice in Bolivia*. Durham: Duke University Press

Gramsci A (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (eds and trans Q Hoare and G Nowell Smith). New York: International Publishers

Gramsci A (1995) *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (ed and trans D Boothman). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Gustafson B (2020) *Bolivia in the Age of Gas*. Durham: Duke University Press

Hesketh C (2017) Passive revolution: A universal concept with geographical seats. *Review of International Studies* 43(3):389-408

Hesketh C (2019) A Gramscian conjuncture in Latin America? Reflections on violence, hegemony, and geographical difference. *Antipode* 51(5):1474-1494

Hesketh C (2020) Between Pachakuti and passive revolution: The search for post-colonial sovereignty in Bolivia. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 33(4):567-586

Hesketh C (2025) What's at stake in the plurinational state debate? The case of Bolivia. *Radical Americas* 10(1) https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.ra.2025.v10.1.001

Hesketh C and Morton A D (2014) Spaces of uneven development and class struggle in Bolivia: Transformation or *trasformismo*? *Antipode* 46(1):149-169

Hindery D (2013) *From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press

Lombardozzi L and Pitts F H (2020) Social form, social reproduction, and social policy: Basic income, basic services, basic infrastructure. *Capital & Class* 44(4):573-594

Lubbock R (2024) *Cultivating Socialism: Venezuela, ALBA, and the Politics of Food Sovereignty*. Athens: University of Georgia Press

Maclean K (2023) *Cash, Clothes, and Construction: Rethinking Value in Bolivia's Pluri-Economy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Malm A (2020) *Corona, Climate, Chronic Emergency: War Communism in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Verso

Marston A (2024) *Subterranean Matters: Cooperative Mining and Resource Nationalism in Plurinational Bolivia*. Durham: Duke University Press

Modonesi M (2013) Revoluciones pasivas en América Latina: Una aproximación gramsciana a la caracterización de los gobiernos progresistas de inicio de siglo. In M Modonesi (ed) *Horizontes Gramscianos: Estudios en torno al pensamiento de Antonio Gramsci* (pp209-236). Mexico City: UNAM.

Paige J M (2020) *Indigenous Revolution in Ecuador and Bolivia, 1990-2005*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press

Quevedo C (2019) Revoluciones pasivas, cesarismo y transformismo: El ciclo progresista latinoamericano y las categorías de Gramsci. In CEEP Germinal (eds) *Gramsci: La teoría de la hegemonía y las transformaciones políticas recientes en América Latina* (pp128-144). Asunción: Centro de Estudios y Educación Popular Germinal

Rivera Cusicanqui S (2010) *Ch'ixinakax utxiwa: Una reflexión sobre prácticas y discursos descolonizadores*. Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón

Roio M D (2012) Translating passive revolution in Brazil. *Capital & Class* 36(2):215-234

Salgado P (2023) Against sovereignty: The colonial limits of modern politics. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 52(1):85-108

Therborn G (1978) *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? State Apparatuses and State Power under Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism*. London: New Left Books

Tilzey M (2021) Authoritarian populism and neo-extractivism in Bolivia and Ecuador: The unresolved agrarian question and the prospects for food sovereignty as counter-hegemony. In I Scoones, M Edelman, S M Borras, L F Forero, R Hall, W Wolford and B White (eds) *Authoritarian Populism and the Rural World* (pp266-292). London: Routledge

Webber J R (2011) *Red October: Left-Indigenous Struggles in Modern Bolivia*. Leiden: Brill

Webber J R (2016) Evo Morales and the political economy of passive revolution in Bolivia, 2006-15. *Third World Quarterly* 37(10):1855-1876

Webber J R (2017) Evo Morales, *transformismo*, and the consolidation of agrarian capitalism in Bolivia. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 17(2):330-347

Webber J R (2025) Self-saboteur: The experience of Latin American populism. *Historical Materialism* 32(4):3-71

Rowan Lubbock
School of Politics and International Relations
Queen Mary, University of London
r.lubbock@qmul.ac.uk

June 2025